

Leo Strauss, “On the Wisdom of the Ancients / Some Remarks on Hesiod”

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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION¹

Building on the momentum of his work on the secret teaching of Maimonides’s *Guide of the Perplexed* in 1937–38 as a “Special Fellow in Jewish History at the University of Columbia” (New York),² Leo Strauss began to develop an esoteric reading of the classical writers, in a series of letters to Jacob Klein, from October 15, 1938, to November 28, 1939,³ as well as in his first, uncompleted essay on this topic, “On the Study of Classical Political Philosophy” (dated Nov. 22–27, 1938), in relation to the courses he prepared

¹ The edition of Strauss’s text presented here and the material used in this introduction derive from my PhD dissertation, “Leo Strauss à la New School for Social Research (1938–1948): Essais, conférences et cours sur la philosophie politique ancienne et moderne” (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2013). I thank Nathan Tarcov and Jenny Strauss-Clay for their permission to publish my transcription of the material from the Leo Strauss Papers, and Hannes Kerber for reviewing it.

² See “The Secret Teaching of Maimonides” (most likely a work plan for the Miller Foundation Fellowship 1937–38), in *Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 616–18. Strauss mentioned his project for a “lexicon of the secret words” to Hans Jonas, July 13, 1937 (HJ Nachlass, Universität Konstanz, Germany) and to Klein, Feb. 16, 1938 (GS 3:550).

³ See “Leo Strauss—Jacob Klein Korrespondenz,” in *Leo Strauss Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, ed. Heinrich Meier and Wiebke Meier, 3rd ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 2022). Among the three items absent from this collection, a letter to Klein dated May 4, 1938, about the meaning of Plato’s *Republic* must also be mentioned (Jacob Klein Papers, Series 2, Letters 2, Box 6, Folder 4, St. John’s College, Annapolis, MD).

and delivered during teaching his first years in the United States.⁴ He described its intention and planned content in a letter to Klein dated Nov. 27, 1938:⁵

Secundo de tractatinuculo. Send it back, please, *immediately*, if possible, with your critical remarks. I will *not* let it be printed, but I would like, when I write to Baron the letter in question, to have your judgment at hand.⁶ I have begun a new paper on the same theme—*te non effugit me de philosophia a historia liberanda scriptitare:*⁷ On the study of classical political philosophy, in which I want to show that Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon are *not* historians—of course not⁸—but the authors of exoteric, protreptical writings (*προτρεπτικοί εἰς φιλοσ.*). History would have been for them the telling of *μετὰ ταῦτα, μετὰ ταῦτα*¹⁰ *ad infinitum*, and not a serious thing. Their historical works are exactly as these *juvenile* readings that Plato recommends in Book 3 of the *Republic*: *prose* writings in which the *μεταξὺ τῶν ρήσεων*¹¹ (i.e. the presentation of the *ἐργά*) prevails over the *ρήσεις* (i.e. the *λόγοι*, the speeches that are inserted in the historical works)—whereas e.g. the tragic poets do not write only not in prose but are exclusively *λόγοι*. (The Platonic dialogues, in which the author *fully κρύπτεται*,¹² belong according to Plato to a higher level.) I want to show this *in concreto* in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which is quite a great book of sublime irony: what is Socrates is shown in his caricature, Cyrus. This is only through the medium of his caricature that Xenophon shows the real, hidden Socrates, whereas he shows in the

⁴ He considered delivering it as a lecture at St. John's College (see Strauss to Klein, Feb. 16, 1939, in GS 3:566). The typescript was published in *Toward "Natural Right and History": Lectures and Essays by Leo Strauss, 1937–1946*, ed. J. A. Colen and Svetozar Minkov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 126–37.

⁵ GS 3:559. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the German are my own.

⁶ The “little treatise” is “The Literary Character of the *Guide of the Perplexed*,” eventually published in *Essays on Maimonides: An Octocentennial Volume*, ed. Salo W. Baron (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), 37–91. Strauss worked as an assistant to Baron, professor of history at the University of Columbia, especially in the elaboration of this volume (see Baron to Strauss, Oct. 18, 1937, LSP B1 F3). Strauss's annotated copy of the printed essay bears the following dates on its first page: “March 1938. May 14–23, 1938. June 21–July 21, 1938” (LSP, B26 F32). Cf. Strauss to Klein, July 23, 1938, in GS 3:553f.

⁷ “It did not escape you that I write about philosophy in order to liberate from history.”

⁸ Expression in English in the text.

⁹ “exhortations to philosophy” (I slightly correct the printed text on the basis of the manuscript).

¹⁰ “thereafter, thereafter” (cf. Leo Strauss, “Greek Historians,” *Review of Metaphysics* 27, no. 4 [June 1968]: 661, and “The Problem of Socrates” [1970], ed. David Bolotin et al., *Interpretation* 22, no. 3 [Spring 1995]: 325f.).

¹¹ “(intervals) between the discourses” (cf. Plato, *Republic* III 393b8 and 394b4).

¹² “hides himself”

Memorabilia the φανερός¹³ Socrates. His portrait of Socrates is then not fundamentally different from Plato's. Ως συνελόντι εἰπεῖν¹⁴—the *Cyropaedia* is a most highly unbarbaric presentation of the ugliness of barbarism, i.e. the lack of παιδεία, and thus a most highly “cultivated” (εὐχαριστότατος) προτρεπτικός to παιδεία.¹⁵ That is so!

Strauss began his teaching as a lecturer at the New School for Social Research in the Spring term 1938, with a seminar on Aristotle's *Politics*.¹⁶ However, he could not maintain this position after 1938–39,¹⁷ and he did not deliver at the New School the courses announced in the curriculum for 1939–40.¹⁸ Supported by the Committee on Exiled Scholars of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, he delivered courses and lectures in several liberal arts colleges of excellence (“Little Ivies”) from fall 1939 to summer 1940. He reports as follows in a letter to Klein dated July 25, 1939 (GS

¹³ “visible”

¹⁴ “To summarize” (a formula often used by Xenophon).

¹⁵ “(most charming) exhortation to paideia”

¹⁶ “Dear Doctor Strauss, Following our conversation, I am happy to write you that we are glad to invite you to give a seminar in our Faculty during the spring term beginning January 31 on Aristotle's *Politics*. We hope very much that you will be able to accept our invitation” (letter from Arthur Feiler, in behalf of the Graduate Faculty of Politics and Social Science Organized under the New School for Social Research, Jan. 12, 1938, LSP B1 F13).—“Today evening I had my first seminar: Aristotle's *Politics*” (Strauss to Klein, Feb. 7, 1938, in GS 3:546; cf. Feb. 16, 1938, in GS 3:550).—In the Leo Strauss Papers (B6 F5), among documents dated 1938 appears a notebook written in pencil on Aristotle's *Politics* (mainly on 1252, 1274a–1279b), thirty-nine numbered pages and a few unnumbered ones; Aquinas's commentary is used.

¹⁷ “Lectureship New School 2 years 2000 a year to-day awarded to me” (Strauss to Klein, May 5, 1938, postcard in English, Jacob Klein Papers, loc. cit.—not in GS 3). “It has turned out meanwhile that Johnson considers my ‘position’ as absolutely temporary. He expects that I have found a position anywhere *at the latest* at the end of the 2nd year” (Strauss to Klein, Feb. 16, 1939, in GS 3:566).—“Johnson has formally stricken me from the list of the faculty members of the New School” (Strauss to Klein, Nov. 28, 1939, GS 3, 587).—“Harold J. Laski of the London School of Economics, a man hardly congenial to Strauss' way of thinking, indeed quite the reverse, not only recommended the ‘brilliant German refugee,’ to Dr. Alvin Johnson . . . but he also made Strauss' appointment financially possible by donating to the School the fees he had just collected on a lecture tour through the United States” (memorial lecture in honor of Leo Strauss, delivered by Erich Hula on Friday, October 18, 1974 at Swayduck Lecture Hall, New School Graduate Faculty Center—Erich Hula Papers, Series 3, Box 5, Folder 12, p. 3, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, German and Jewish Intellectual Émigré Collection).

¹⁸ A typed list titled “Changes in the catalogue 1939–40,” kept in the New School Library, indicates that the following scheduled courses by Leo Strauss for Fall 1939 would not be given: “Persecution and Freedom of Thought in Classical Antiquity,” “Political Philosophy from Hooker to Spinoza,” and the seminar “Political Science and the Study of History in Antiquity” (“on the basis of classical passages in the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle”).

3:573): "With the colleges, it is now settled. They are: Amherst,¹⁹ Hamilton,²⁰ Union,²¹ Middlebury,²² and Wesleyan University.²³ I have to spend teaching in Hamilton, Middlebury and Union 6 weeks each, in Wesleyan 3 weeks, and in Amherst the rest of the year. At the New School, there is a whole party which is more or less indignant at my leaving and at Johnson's attitude."

At Hamilton College in October–November 1939 Strauss gave a course on "Hesiod and Pre-Socratics,"²⁴ mostly devoted to a close reading of the

¹⁹ "We go the day after tomorrow to Amherst, where we hope to be able to stay until September 1" (Strauss to Klein, Feb. 20, 1940, in GS 3:587).

²⁰ "First I go to Hamilton. There I have to lecture about early Greek philosophy and political thought before 22 students. Besides, I have to give a few public lectures (I proposed: on the Socratic problem)" (Strauss to Klein, Aug. 7, 1939, in GS 3:575.) "I stay here until Nov. 9, then I go for two days to N.Y., and on 12 to Union (Schenectady)" (Strauss to Klein, Oct. 10, 1939, in GS 3:583).—"Dr. Leo Strauss, German Refugee, to Teach Six-Week Course Here": "Dr. Leo Strauss, who is visiting here as an assistant to the Department of Philosophy, began his lectures to the combined courses of the History of Philosophy and Political Theory last Monday morning. Outside of his scheduled classes, Dr. Strauss will probably do some incidental lecturing during his six weeks here. His special interest lies in the pre-Socratic philosophers, and it is the era of such men that he is covering in his classes" (*Hamilton Life*, Oct. 4, 1939, 1).

²¹ "My course is about Plato's political philosophy, Aristotle and Hobbes. Besides, I play a part on occasions in the Latin course (*Jus naturae* and *jus gentium* in the Romans), in the Greek course (Socrates' trial). Besides, I speak at the Classical Club on 12.12 about Xenophon. Finally at the synagogue (!) about Maimonides" (Strauss to Klein, Union College, Schenectady, Nov. 28, 1939, in GS 3:586).—"Dr. Strauss, an exiled German political philosopher and historian, has been acting as visiting lecturer at Union since November 13, displaying versatility in lectures to courses in Greek and Latin literature as well as in philosophy" (*The Concordiensis*, Tuesday, Dec. 5, 1939, 1). "Besides his Spencer lecture ['Persecution and the Art of Writing,' Dec. 8] Dr. Strauss gave a series of lectures on classical political philosophy" (*Union Alumni Monthly*, March, 1940, 97).

²² An unsigned article in the *New York Times*, dated by hand 11–12–39, states: "Dr. Leo Strauss, authority in the field of political philosophy, will be guest lecturer for six weeks at Middlebury College this Winter. Dr. Strauss has been invited by the American Philosophical Association for the placement of German refugee scholars" (Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars Records, file "Leo Strauss," New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division).—"Dr. Strauss is visiting Middlebury for a period of six weeks. He is at present conducting Prof. John T. Andrew's Political Philosophy seminar. After midterm, he will conduct Prof. Andrew's Ethics class and Prof. Charles H. Kaiser's History of Philosophy class, lecturing on Bacon and Hobbes in the latter" (*Middlebury Campus*, December 6, 1939, 2; January 24, 1940, 1).

²³ "Excerpt from Newspaper Clipping of December 10, 1939: TO LECTURE AT WESLEYAN . . . Dr. Leo Strauss, a German philosopher and refugee in this country, will visit Wesleyan the last two weeks in March" (typed page, Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars Records, file "Leo Strauss"). Only a public lecture, "Persecution and the Art of Writing," on March 14, 1940, is recorded (*Wesleyan Argus*, Thursday, March 21, 1940, 1).

²⁴ Manuscript notebook dated Sept. 7, 1939, 27 folios (LSP B6 F7); course originally scheduled for the New School, Fall 1939. Strauss did not publish specifically on Hesiod; however, relevant accounts occur in his discussion of Havelock, "The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy" (1959), repr. in *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 34ff, and in "Jerusalem and Athens" (1967), repr. in *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity*, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 394ff.

Works and Days; Parmenides is the only other author treated at some length. "The Wisdom of the Ancients" was a possible subject for a lecture at Middlebury College in January or February 1940;²⁵ its topic occurs in the plans for a second part of the uncompleted essay "Exoteric Teaching" (Dec. 1939).²⁶ Strauss displayed the outlines of his interpretation in a letter to Klein dated October 10, 1939 (GS 3:581–82):

You made in your last letter some enigmatic indications (excuse the pleonasm) concerning the *Timaeus*.²⁷ Since then I am curious at the highest degree? The question mark is a missed act: "Id" anticipated the question.²⁸ Is it so that the difference between Plato and Aristotle is considerably smaller than you admitted, let's say, three months ago? Please, answer this question with some detail.

Meanwhile, I have been occupied with a book of which I would like to believe a priori that it is indispensable for the understanding of the *Timaeus*: Hesiod's *Theogony*. This is of course not a theogony, as the title already proves it (for which good author indicates the theme in the title, instead of letting the reader find it), but an answer to the question of what are the first, the unborn things, moreover an elucidation of the Olympians from this question, and finally an explanation about what these questions and answers mean, i.e. what wisdom means. The first things are not the gods, but such things as earth, heaven, stars,

²⁵ "The tentative list of subjects for the general open lectures from which Mr. Strauss will choose includes: 'The Wisdom of the Ancients,' 'The Problem of Socrates,' and 'Hobbes' Political Philosophy'" ("Leo Strauss Will Visit Middlebury: Political Philosopher, Exile from Germany, to Teach in January," *Middlebury Campus*, Nov. 1939, 1). Strauss's lecturing on Bacon seems not to have dealt with *De sapientia veterum*, according to Charles Hillis Kaiser, "Philosophy and the Modern Curriculum" (*Middlebury College News Letter*, June 1940, 17): "Dr. Leo Strauss, a refugee scholar who spent six weeks at Middlebury this year as a visiting lecturer in philosophy, presented good evidence that Francis Bacon was the source of the modern repudiation of Aristotle's notion of intellectual virtue and the dignifying of moral virtue in its place."

²⁶ Items (8) "Plato's remarks on Homer and especially on Hesiod" and (9) "Hesiod on Muses" in the "Early Plan," and item (12) "Plato on the poets and Hesiod on Muses" in the "Later Plan," ed. Hannes Kerber in *Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s*, ed. Martin D. Yaffe and Richard S. Ruderman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 288 and 292.—Within the section "Exoteric Teaching Material" (LSP B17 F2) appears a sheet, on which quotations from Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* (Everyman ed.) have been written in pencil:

Division of poetry into narration, representation, and allusive or paradoxical poetry.

"...there remaineth [...] many of them." (83 f.)

"...to me ... it seemth best ... to retain [...]

[Reference to the following note at the bottom of the same page:]

cf. The Wisdom of the Ancients

"For ciphers,¹⁾ they are commonly [...] the weakest ciphers." (139)

²⁷ The reference is to Klein's letter dated Aug. 14, 1939, in GS 3:577–79 (cf. Jacob Klein, "On the 'Frame' of Plato's *Timaeus*," trans. Laurence Berns et al., in *St. John's Review* 35, no. 2 [Spring 1984]: 63–64).

²⁸ Allusion to the psychoanalytical parapraxis ("Freudian slip").

ocean, which are in one passage explicitly distinguished from the *theoi (haplōs)*.²⁹ The key to the book is—the Muses, which are explicitly referred to as the main theme. The Muses have a double genealogy: 1) exoterically they descend from Zeus and Mnemosyne; 2) esoterically they are the offspring of Ocean.³⁰ You will immediately guess how this is linked on the basis of the beginning of the *Odyssey*, as well as of the remarks in the *Theaetetus* and in the *Metaphysics* about the origin of Thales's principle.³¹ It is clearly said in the revelation to Hesiod (vv. 26–28) that the whole is a mixture of truth and lie (the interpretation by Jaeger, Wilamowitz, and all the others completely reverses the facts of the case).³² I do not know what Hesiod really thought about the first things themselves: Plato says in the *Cratylus*, when he comes to speak of this question, “*oimai*.³³ But what I know with certainty is what it has to do with *Erga* and *Hemeraī*.³⁴ You once raised the question of what the title means. The answer: replace only each element by its demonstrable opposite from the poem itself: *epē kai nyktes*, i.e. veiled discourses. The theme is: an *agon* between the nightingale and the hawk, i.e. the singer and the king, with an exoteric morale for *hoi polloi* (the last point, the exoteric character of the eulogy of work, lies close to the surface).³⁵ And Hesiod is explicitly the singer.

To say it briefly, what Plato says in the *Theaetetus* about the poets of old times, namely, that they would have veiled philosophy through poetry,³⁶ can be really *proved* as regards Hesiod (who appears also in the *Republic* somewhere in the middle of an enumeration).³⁷ I am convinced that it is not different with Homer. Just read the shield of Achilleus!³⁸ And the self-identification with *Odysseus* in the *Odyssey*, and the remarkable fact that Thersites *tells* the truth.³⁹ The orientation

²⁹ “gods (simply).” See Hesiod, *Theogony*, vv. 105–10.

³⁰ “Urania” is both the name of one of the Muses (daughters of Mnemosyne) and the name of one of the Ocean's daughters (vv. 78 and 350).

³¹ See Plato, *Theaetetus* 152e; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.3 983b20ff.

³² See Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1934), 88–108 (esp. 108); Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hesiodos Erga* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1928).

³³ “I believe” (*Cratylus* 402b5–6).

³⁴ “Works” and “Days.”

³⁵ See Hesiod, *Works and Days*, vv. 202ff., 287ff.

³⁶ See *Theaetetus* 180c9–d1.

³⁷ Possible allusion to *Republic* VIII 546e1ff.

³⁸ See Homer, *Iliad* XVIII.474–617. This passage was interpreted allegorically by ancient philosophers: see, e.g., Heraclitus, *Homeric Problems*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell and David Konstan (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), chaps. 43–51.

³⁹ See *Iliad* II.211ff.

upon Shakespeare, i.e. upon the superiority of image over thought, is a calamity for the understanding of wisdom disguised as poetry.

In relation to my course (Greek philosophy up to Plato in 6 weeks!), I have read again Parmenides's fragments for the first time since Natorp's times.⁴⁰ (What Reinhardt says about Parmenides⁴¹ is far, far above the level of all that Jaeger can ever have wished only with regard to his own achievement.) The affinity with Hesiod backward and Plato forward catches the eye. Besides, have you noticed that in the covering everything is feminine: the goddess and the female *daimôn*, the Sun's daughters and the mares, and Anankè, and Dikè, and Moira; Parmenides is the unique male being who appears. The interpretation is to be found in A 52 f.⁴² women are "warmer" (i.e. more luminous) than men. A milestone in the critique of *andreia*.⁴³ The sentence itself is as ironical as what is said in the *Republic* about the equality of women⁴⁴—the background is the same in both cases. And still some things that one can see only if one does not believe in "the Greeks," but in philosophy.

[Continued on next page]

⁴⁰ See Strauss to Gadamer, February 26, 1961, in "Correspondence concerning *Wahrheit und Methode*," *Independent Journal of Philosophy* 2 (1978): 5. Paul Natorp (1854–1924), a major figure of the neo-Kantian school, gave at the University of Marburg in February–April 1919 "Übungen über die ältere griechische Philosophie (Vorsokratiker)"; in September–December 1919 "Geschichte der älteren griechischen Philosophie."

⁴¹ Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1916). Strauss used it and Kurt Riezler's *Parmenides* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1934) in his course. Cf. Strauss, "Kurt Riezler, 1882–1955" (1956), in *What Is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 238–41.

⁴² "Parmenides and others, for instance, assert that women are hotter than men on the ground of the menstrual flow, which they say is due to their heat and the abundance of their blood." Parmenides, frg. A 52 DK = Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals* II.2 648a29–31, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937). Cf. Reinhardt, *Parmenides*, 21f.

⁴³ This critique is a red thread in Strauss's work: see, e.g., *Philosophy and Law*, trans. Eve Adler (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 136n2; *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936), 146f.; "The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6, no. 4 (1939): 520f.

⁴⁴ See *Republic* V 452e4ff.

ON THE WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS / SOME REMARKS ON HESIOD

[1939]¹

1. Bacon

2. Plato and Xenophon about ὑπόνοια²

3. Hesiod's Ἔργα—obvious teaching—work = justice

idleness = injustice; farming superior to
sailing;

why man ought to work: Work as a curse—lot of man is bad.

Work as a blessing—lot of the just is good.

1. Poet and singer.

2. The sources of Hes.' teaching: a) the Muses.

b) Hes' own experience and saying;

c) φασί.³

3. None of the 3 sources guarantees the truth of the teaching.

Hidden Muses: truth disguised by lies.

cf. Op. 708-714: κακοὶ ἔρδειν ≠ ψεύδεσθαι⁴

¹ Leo Strauss Papers, box 6, folder 7, University of Chicago Library, Special Collections. Four unnumbered lined sheets have been written with a pen. Close to them appears a series of disparate sheets written with a pencil, which contain workplans for the lecture and reading notes on Hesiod's *Works and Days* and *Theogony* ("Opp." refers to *Opera*, i.e., *Works and Days*), which have likely been also prepared for the course on Hesiod. The titles that are not underlined in the manuscript have been italicized throughout the text. All footnotes are the work of the editor, except note 1) on the second lined sheet, which is Strauss's. The symbols <> are used to indicate crossed-out portions of text in the manuscripts.

² "covert meaning." —In his course "Hesiod and Pre-Socratics" (LSP B6 F3 fol. 3 verso), Strauss made note of the following references, in pencil:

ὑπόνοια: in Platon, *Rep.* 378d only (Ast [*Lexicon Platonicum*])
in Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1128a24 only (Bonitz [*Index Aristotelicus*])

³ "they say"

⁴ "doing evils ≠ lying"

You may lie to your enemy—but if you do, do it well?

the Muses may lie to their enemies

cf. 282 f. Th. 783

cf. Th. 227-229 with Opp. 11 ff. if there are 2 ἔριδες, there must be 2 lies.

→ Hes. is then not indifferent at all to the question of truth: philosophy
was extant.

4. Ambiguities of Hes.' teaching concerning ἔργα—ἀεργίη.⁵

I. Obvious teaching: work and justice, idleness and injustice—
farming better than sailing.

II. Secret teaching:

a) Recommendation of work is conditional: problematic
character of praise of wealth and blame of poverty.

Is there an alternative to the antithesis work-idleness or
bees-drones, and which is it? Do we find any indication to
the effect that there are 3, not only 2, ways of life?

b) Perses—Kings	father	Hesiod
ἀχρήιος	ἐσθλός	πανάριστος ⁶
νήπιος ⁷		
drone	bee	singer

"Ἔργα are distinguished not only from ἀεργίη, but also from
ἔπη and βουλαί.⁸

Singer is the 3rd βίος, superior to both bees and drones.

c) Deprecation of the bees

Drones are “stingless”—“beggar and singer.”

⁵ “works—idleness” (see W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary of Hesiod's Works and Days vv. 1–382* [Leiden: Brill, 1985], ad v. 311).

⁶ “worthless” “good” “best of all” (see Verdenius, *Commentary*, ad vv. 214 and 297).

⁷ “child” (see Verdenius, *Commentary*, ad vv. 131 and 218).

⁸ “words” and “advices”

Working as a curse—man may be just without working at all in golden age.

Shepherds are mere bellies: Muses are the daughters of Memory, Toil is the brother of Forgetfulness.

Muses are not mentioned⁹ as regards farming, whereas they are mentioned in connection with sailing: work ≠ way (όδός).

d) The obvious teaching is addressed to the νήπιος, more precisely to the ruled or poor and the slaves.

The poor must work.

¹⁰e) α) Kings not necessarily δωροφάγοι¹¹ (cf. Opp. 126) and νήπιοι (cf. 202).¹² Zeus is king—Theog. 79 ff.

Work not inseparable from justice.

β) The real problem is, not work-idleness, but singer-king: 202 ff.

γ) This problem is the problem of the Ἔργα. For: the work is devoted to settling a νεῖκος;¹³ 35 f.

Perseus = kings—δῖον γένος¹⁴ (299): 274 ff. (addressed to Perseus) is the answer to 202 ff. (addressed to the kings).

Victory of the singer: Perseus has to ask Hesiod for his help (cf. 265 f.).

e) King as such is higher than farmer as such. But what is the relation of the king to the singer? The ambiguous statement of Theog. 79 ff.

[later plan verso]

Indication of the problem: 202 ff.

⁹ <invoked> mentioned

¹⁰ [In the left margin is written an indication to turn over the page:] Verte!

¹¹ “gift eaters” (see Verdenius, *Commentary*, ad v. 39).

¹² This subtler statement, as compared with the “earlier plan,” suggests that this plan has been written later.

¹³ “quarrel” (see Verdenius, *Commentary*, ad loc.).

¹⁴ “of divine kin”

cf. 260-273 Wilam. ad v. 39: "Klipp und klar steht da, dass der Prozess nicht entschieden ist; er kann sogar durch Vergleichen vermieden werden."¹⁵

30 f. Wilam. to 133 f.: "wie der Prozess ausgegangen ist, steht nirgends."¹⁶

v. 26 ff. seems to show that the law-suit is still pending.

v. 34 seems to show that Perses succeeded in ἀρπάζειν¹⁷ by bribing the judges.

[1st lined sheet] ¹⁸The expression "Wisdom of the Ancients" may sound somewhat old-fashioned, almost Elizabethan. I may confess as well that I took it over from Francis Bacon. For what Bacon wrote in the preface to his De Sapientia Veterum is apt to lead us up to both an independent study of the wisdom of the ancients, and an understanding of the reason why the generations which followed Bacon, became more and more unable to take that wisdom into consideration.

Bacon understood by the wisdom of the ancients the wisdom of the "antiquitas primaeva," i.e. of pre-literary antiquity. That wisdom, he asserted, has come down to us in¹⁹ the disguise of fables or myths. The authors of those myths did not believe in those myths: they simply used them in order to express by means of them, such truths as could have been stated by them in quite unmythical terms. The authors of those myths which teach the truth in a disguised way, are not the poets, Homer and Hesiod in particular, but truly wise men belonging to the pre-Homeric, the pre-poetic²⁰ age; the poets merely incorporated those²¹ myths into their works and

¹⁵ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hesiodes Erga*, 46: "It appears clear and sharp that the trial is not decided; it can even be avoided through transaction."

¹⁶ Ibid., 133-34 (slightly abridged): "how the trial has ended occurs nowhere."

¹⁷ "stealing" (see Verdenius, Commentary, ad v. 38).

¹⁸ [Abbreviations are spelled out without comment in this elaborated part. Written in pencil on the top of the first lined sheet (editorial additions in brackets):]

Bacon's source is Cornutus [*Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, chap. 17, beg., and 35, end] (Seneca, ep. 90).

ποιητής—cf. H[enri] Weil in *Études sur l'antiquité grecque* ([Paris: Hachette,] 1900), p. 237 f. [chap. "L'origine du mot 'poète,'" 237-47]

¹⁹ <in the form> in

²⁰ <much older> the pre-Homeric, the pre-poetic

²¹ <that anc> those

thus transmitted²² them to posterity.²³ The wise men of the antiquitas primaeva used parables to teach the truth, since this²⁴ was the only way in which they could demonstrate the truth: “parabolae argumentis erant antiquiores”;²⁵ the oldest method of demonstrating the truth is to use similes.²⁶

It is not necessary for my purpose to discuss the question as to whether Bacon was fully convinced of the truth of his assertion—let me examine that assertion on its own merits.

Bacon asserts that the wisdom of the ancients is hidden wisdom, wisdom in disguise. I.e., he bids us to interpret the myths allegorically. By this, Bacon merely continues the age-old tradition of allegoric interpretation. He deviates somewhat from this tradition by asserting that the secret wisdom of the ancients is the wisdom of pre-literary antiquity. I.e. not²⁷ the classical authors themselves are the teachers of that secret wisdom, they are merely its unconscious transmitters. When we meet with a myth, say, in Hesiod, we have to consider that myth as a residue of an age much older than Hesiod; as far as it is such a residue, it has to be interpreted allegorically; but as far as it is a part of a Hesiodic poem, it is just a part of a poem, it does not convey a secret teaching. This amounts to saying that Bacon no longer applies the allegorical method to the classical authors themselves. But he goes much beyond that by asserting: that pre-literary antiquity disguised its wisdom because of the intellectual shortcomings of the men of that time (“rudibus tunc temporis hominum ingeniis”).²⁸ For this assertion implies the contention that by²⁹ the progress [2nd lined sheet] of enlightenment and science, wisdom will be enabled to appear among men in an undisguised manner. Let us go one step beyond Bacon; let us assume that mankind

²² <preserved it> transmitted them

²³ Cf. Strauss, “The Origin of Modern Political Thought” (ca. 1936), fol. 2f.: “As long as they were under the spell if not of actual antiquity, at least of the idea of antiquity, they tried to replace veneration for actual, known antiquity by search for another antiquity which was older than Greek antiquity: scholars like Grotius, Joseph Scaliger, and Stevin were very much interested in the siècle sage, compared with which even Greek antiquity was a period of barbarism.”

²⁴ <there was no other method> this

²⁵ “Nam ut hieroglyphica literis, ita parabolae argumentis erant antiquiores.” Francis Bacon, *De sapientia veterum*, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (London: Longman, 1858), 6:628. Cf. *The Wisedome of the Ancients*, trans. Arthur Gorges (London, 1619): “for as Hieroglyphicks preceded letters, so parables were more ancient than Arguments.”

²⁶ <a simile> similes

²⁷ <if we find a myth in Homer or Hesiod> not

²⁸ “the understandings of men were in those times rude.” Bacon, *De sapientia veterum*, 628, from the sentence immediately preceding the one quoted above.

²⁹ <with> by

is successfully engaged in a process of ever increasing enlightenment; in that stage, people will object to any concealment of wisdom, they will demand that science be made popular. And we may visualize a still more advanced stage, a stage in which people will have forgotten that wisdom had to be disguised at all, and they will no longer be able to understand that³⁰ wisdom had been disguised at any earlier time. This last stage has been reached by the end of the 18th century, and we still live in it. We do no longer understand—we do not even reckon with the very possibility that the wisdom of the ancients, i.e. of the classical authors, is hidden wisdom, that their teaching is a secret teaching.

The view that the works of the classical authors, especially Homer and Hesiod, contain a secret teaching was very common in former times. In classical antiquity, people spoke of the *úπόνοια* (the hidden thought) of the poet as distinguished from the apparent and obvious meaning of his utterances. Of course, very much depends on who these people were. At a first glance, one gets the impression that search for the hidden thoughts of the poets was characteristic of some sophists and of the Stoics, whereas the most sober critics of antiquity, the philologists of Alexandria, rejected it. By rejecting the search for the hidden thought of the poets, these Alexandrian philologists were following Aristotle who, in his turn, merely continued a tradition established by Socrates and Plato. Thus, the greatest authorities of ancient criticism as well as of ancient philosophy appear to have rejected the view that the wisdom of the poets is hidden wisdom, or that their teaching is a secret teaching. That view seems to be backed by very dubious authorities only: by the sophists, the Stoics, the Neoplatonists and Neopythagoreans. This much about the first impression of who the ancient authorities were who favoured the view that the works of the poets contain a secret teaching.

Is this first impression correct?

In a standard history of Greek literature, I find this statement: "In the Socratic circle, this operating with a hidden meaning (of the poems) was rejected."¹⁾ To prove this statement, the author refers to one passage from Xenophon, and to three passages from Plato. Now, if we look up the passages in question, we make a surprising discovery: not a single passage of those referred to contains as much as a hint of a

¹⁾ "Im sokrat. Kreis wurde dieses Arbeiten mit einem geheimen Sinn (*úπόνοια*) abgelehnt . ." Schmid und Stählin, Gesch. d. griech. Literatur, 131. [Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, ed. Iwan von Müller et al., Abt. 7, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Erster Teil, *Die klassische Periode der griechischen Literatur*, by Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, Erster Band, *Die griechische Literatur vor der attischen Hegemonie* (Munich: Beck, 1929).]

³⁰ [Written above in pencil, without choice:] it

[3rd lined
sheet]

rejection of the view that Homer's and Hesiod's poems have a hidden meaning. Two passages out of the 3 Platonic passages (Euthyphron 6a and Phaedrus 237a [sic!]) have nothing whatsoever to do with our question. The third Platonic passage (Rep. 378d) explicitly leaves it undecided whether Homer's θεομάχιαι etc. are ἐν ύπονοίαις πεποιημέναι or ἀνεν ύπονοιῶν.³¹ And as regards the passage from Xenophon (Sympos. 3, 6), it is clearly in favour of the view that the works³² of the poets contain a secret teaching. In the passage from Xenophon, Socrates states why the reciters of Homer are so silly: they are so silly because they do not understand τὰς ύπονοίας. Xenophon's Socrates, far from rejecting the operating with the hidden meaning of the poet, explicitly recognizes it as sound and indispensable. Now, Xenophon is not generally recognized as a high authority in philosophical matters. Let us, therefore, consider somewhat more closely the views of Plato. The main passages in which Plato deals with our problem, are to be found in the Protagoras, the Republic, and the Theaetetus. In the Protagoras, he lets the sophist Protagoras state that the wise men of old—Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Orpheus etc.—concealed their wisdom because they realized, and were afraid of, its invidiousness; they³³ concealed it by not saying that they were wise men, but by saying that they were poets: they concealed their wisdom under the guise of poetry. In the Republic (378d), Socrates leaves it open whether Homer's and Hesiod's poems contain a hidden meaning or not. In the Theaetetus Socrates calls Homer the general of the army of people who assert that motion is the origin of all things; he quotes a verse from the *Ilias* which says that Ocean and Tethys³⁴ are the origin of the gods (152e–153a; 160d); Plato assumed then that the verse quoted by him contains a philosophical teaching in³⁵ poetic disguise: "Ocean" is not a person, but the actual ocean,³⁶ or "water." In another passage of the Theaetetus (155d), Socrates states that "marvelling at" (θαυμάζειν) is the origin of philosophy, and, he goes on to say, "the man who asserted Iris to be the descendant from Thaumas, was not a poor genealogist." I.e.: Hesiod's statement that Iris, the messenger of the gods, was the daughter of Thaumas,³⁷ is conceived of by Plato as stating in a disguised way that θαυμάζειν is the origin of the intercourse between gods and men, i.e. of philosophy. And finally, Socrates says in the Theaetetus (180c–d) that the wise men

³¹ "made in covert meaning" or "without covert meaning"

³² <poets> works

³³ <accordingly, this> they

³⁴ Consistently spelled "Thetys" by Strauss (possible confusion with "Thetis," one of the Nereides).

³⁵ <under the> in

³⁶ Quotation marks crossed out around "ocean".

³⁷ See *Theogony*, v. 780.

[4th lined sheet]

of old have³⁸ transmitted the central problem, the problem of being, while hiding it from the multitude by means of poetry, whereas the more recent thinkers, since they were wiser, stated it quite openly, so that even the shoemakers could hear, and understand, their wisdom. This seems to mean that Plato, while believing that the works of the early poets contain a secret teaching, considered the open and undisguised statement of the truth to be a definite sign of a progress. But, the reference to the shoemakers shows that the censure of concealment of the truth is ironical: Plato did not consider the undisguised statement of the truth to be superior to its disguised statement; he considered it indispensable to hide the truth from the vulgar. Cf. Timaeus 28c: "Now to discover the Maker and Father of this Universe were a task indeed; and having discovered Him, to speak of³⁹ Him unto all men is impossible."⁴⁰ (Cf. 7th letter and Phaedrus on writing and Republic on drama.) But we may leave it open whether Plato's own teaching was a secret teaching—we must, however, insist on repeating that Plato conceived of Homer's and Hesiod's poems as containing a secret teaching. Nor ought we to overlook the fact that Plato speaks most unambiguously of the secret character of Homer's and Hesiod's teaching in the most scientific of the 3 dialogues in question: whereas⁴¹ in the Protagoras, which is the most comical of Plato's works, Plato puts the view that Homer and Hesiod are teachers of a secret doctrine into the mouth of Protagoras, and whereas in the Republic, i.e. in a dialogue of Socrates with men who certainly were no scientists or philosophers, Socrates leaves the question undecided, in the Theaetetus, i.e. in a dialogue of Socrates with mathematicians, Socrates answers the question with a definite Yes.

It is then not merely a suspect or apocryphal tradition which backs our contention that the wisdom of the ancients was hidden wisdom—we see that no lesser men than⁴² Plato and Xenophon and Socrates were satisfied that the poems of Homer and Hesiod contained ὑπονοίας.

But we ought not to trust authorities—not even such authorities as Socrates and Plato. We have to attempt an independent study of the texts themselves.

³⁸ <ancients> wise men of old

³⁹ <declare> speak of

⁴⁰ Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).

⁴¹ <whereas he puts the view that Homer and Hesiod are teachers of a secret teaching into the mouth of Protagoras in the Prot> whereas

⁴² <that> than

⁴³Some Remarks on Hesiod's Teaching⁴⁴*[elaborated
plan recto]*

1. The intention of the present⁴⁵ remarks is to discuss some questions which must be raised, if not answered, before a fruitful⁴⁶ interpretation of Hesiod's works can be attempted.⁴⁷ One rarely meets with an interpretation of Hesiod which is not based on the assumption that Hesiod was a poet; and that assumption determines wholly the course of⁴⁸ the interpretation, since poems have to be read and interpreted, in a way fundamentally different from the way in which, say, scientific books or codes of law or histories have to be read and interpreted. Consequently,⁴⁹ if Hesiod's works do⁵⁰ not happen to be poems, the usual interpretation of those works could be fundamentally wrong. Now, Hesiod was not a poet and his works were not poems: the 2 words poet and poem⁵¹ do not exist in his vocabulary, and all men whose writings deserve to be read have the ability of⁵² finding, or coining, the words which adequately express what is uppermost in their mind.⁵³ The words used by Hesiod for designating his activity⁵⁴ and⁵⁵ the product of his activity are, not "poet" and "poem," but "singer" and "song." (Opp. 659–662 Theog. 1, 22, 31–34 and 99 ff.)

Which⁵⁶ is the difference between "poetry" and "song"? Singing is not specifically human: the singer sings just as the bird sings; and the song of a singer is as little subject to the criterion of truth or understanding as is the song of a nightingale

⁴³ This "elaborated plan" is based on the "later plan" above.

⁴⁴ The following text is written on the same kind of paper as the plan displayed at the beginning.

⁴⁵ [*Written above without indication of choice:*] following

⁴⁶ [*Written above without indication of choice:*] adequate
satisfactory

⁴⁷ [*Here the following lines have been crossed out:*] For however unbiased a given interpretation may appear to be—it one rarely meets with an interpretation which For before one sets out to interpret a single line or the entire work of Hes., one must make up one's mind as to know how to proceed in interpreting

⁴⁸ [*Added above the line:*] the course of

⁴⁹ <Thus, if> Consequently

⁵⁰ <could> do

⁵¹ [*Added above with an insertion mark:*] poet and poem

⁵² <to find the words which adequately express> of

⁵³ [*Here the following sentence has been crossed out:*] For the same reason, it is not permitted to call the Theogony in particular a mythology.

⁵⁴ <own doing> activity

⁵⁵ "or" corrected to "and"

⁵⁶ [*Written below the preceding part of the text, as the beginning of a new paragraph, and then crossed out:*] The difference between "poem" and "song" is this: a poem is an invention

or the bark of a wire hair terrier.⁵⁷ Accordingly,⁵⁸ the term "song" occurs prior to the emergence of philosophy,⁵⁹ whereas⁶⁰ the term "poetry" occurs posterior to it. For philosophy is the quest for truth, the conscious and unbending⁶¹ attempt to replace opinions by evident knowledge. The fact that there was song before there was philosophy, means then the singer is not guided by love of⁶² truth, that he is, without knowing it, indifferent to the truth or untruth⁶³ of what he sings. But, after philosophy has emerged, such an unknowing indifference to truth was no longer possible: the singer now became fully aware of the fact that the content of his song was not truth, but—fiction; the singer became—poet.

2. Let us then assume for one moment that Hesiod, belonging to the pre-philosophic age, was utterly indifferent to the⁶⁴ truth or falsehood of his statements, that his only intention was to "sing an unutterable hymn" (Opp. 662), to utter a "clear song" (Opp. 659) or a "beautiful song" (Th. 22) or a "sweet song" (Th. 97). But let us, while making that assumption, venture to address to him this prosaic question: from which source did you, divine singer, derive the content of your song?

Hesiod stoops to answer our question: he tells us that the Muses taught him to sing (Opp. 659, 662. Th. 22, 30 ff.). And he invokes the Muses to sing themselves (Opp. 1 f. Th. 104 ff. 965 ff. 1021 f.)

This answer is bound to⁶⁵ perplex us very much. For we do not believe in the existence of the nine goddesses whom Hesiod called the Muses. And it is very hard for the large majority⁶⁶ of us to imagine how these non-existent nine goddesses could have appeared to, and spoken to, Hesiod. Let us therefore venture to address to Hesiod this question which he will not consider blasphemous, since we raise it humbly and gently: why did you, divine singer, invoke the Muses?

⁵⁷ [Written at the bottom of the page, with an insertion mark:] Singing is not specifically human: the singer sings just as the bird sings; and the song of a singer <is as little true or wrong as is> is as little subject to the criterion of truth or understanding as is the song of a nightingale or the bark of a <boston terrier> wire hair terrier.

⁵⁸ [Written above, next to the insertion mark of the preceding sentence:] Accordingly,

⁵⁹ [Written above, likely referring to Goethe's book:] (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*)

⁶⁰ [Written above the line without indication of choice:] But

⁶¹ [Written above with an insertion mark:] conscious and unbending

⁶² <the quest for> love of

⁶³ <falsehood> untruth

⁶⁴ [Written above:] the

⁶⁵ <must> is bound to

⁶⁶ <quite a lot> the large majority

That this question too is sound, is shown by the fact that Hesiod answers it. Hesiod stoops to answer our somewhat blasphemous question just as he stooped to answer our prosaic question. When speaking in the "Ἐργα of seafaring, he informs us that he has almost⁶⁷ no experience whatsoever⁶⁸ of seafaring, and yet, he is enabled to⁶⁹ speak of it because he has been taught by the Muses—⁷⁰

3.⁷¹ Essential ambiguity of Hes.' teaching.

4. Ambiguity of his teaching concerning ἔργα—ἀεργίη.

1. The obvious teaching. 2. a) recommendation of work is conditional—
if you desire wealth.

Problematic character of the praise of wealth and blame of poverty.

Is there an alternative to the antithesis work—idleness (or bees—drones), and which is it? Do we find in the Opp. any indication to the effect that there are 3, and not only 2, βίοι?

b) Perses	—father	—Hesiod
drone	bee	singer
νήπιος	ἐσθλός	πανάριστος

Ἐργα are distinguished not only from ἀεργίη, but also from ἔπη and βουλαί.

Singer is the 3rd βίος. Singer is superior to both drones and bees

c) Drones are "stingless"—“beggar and singer”

Work is a curse—man may be just without working at all—

Shepherds are mere bellies: Muses are the daughters of Memory,
Toil is the brother of Forgetfulness

Muses are not invoked as regards farming, but they are invoked as regards sailing: work ≠ way

Result: the obvious recommendation of work is not to be taken quite seriously.

⁶⁷ <practically> almost

⁶⁸ <at all> whatsoever

⁶⁹ <does> speak [*Written above:*] is enabled to

⁷⁰ [*Written at the bottom of the page:*] Homer φασί only in Opp. 813, Theog. 306

⁷¹ Points 3 and 4 have been entirely crossed out.

d) The obvious teaching is addressed to the ruled or poor and the slaves.

e) Kings and singers—a contest between king and singer.→
Plato, Ep. II.⁷²

5. Genealogy of the Muses—a) daughters of Zeus and Memory—Zeus knows everything—does he actually? μητιόεις.⁷³

6. Ambiguity of teaching concerning justice.
(including interpretation of Prometheus and Five Ages). Zeus = Perses (cf. 9 f.)

Two direct speeches: Zeus addresses Prometheus; hawk addresses nightingale

7. Plan of the Ἐργα and of the individual parts.

Meaning of Ἐργα καὶ Ἡμέραι.⁷⁴

[earlier
plan recto] On the wisdom of the ancients.⁷⁵

[1. Bacon]⁷⁶

2. Plato—Xenophon—Aristotle

3. Hesiodos' Ἐργα—obvious teaching→ work as a curse and work as a blessing

4. The sources of Hes' teaching and its essential ambiguity

Father was poor

5. Ambiguity of his teaching concerning ἔργα—ἀεργίη

The poor must work: 28 ff. 213 ff.

a) that teaching is conditional: "if" 381 f—cf. 40 f.

→ a morality for the poor

⁷² End of the crossed-out part.

⁷³ "wise in counsel"

⁷⁴ [At the bottom of the page, the following Greek words and references are written:]

ἀλήθεια—Op. 748. 818	γυμνός	Op. 391 f. and 730. (See 334, 418, 460)
Th. 28 233	καλύπτειν	Th. 539 541 798 757 9 745 127
ἔτήτυμα Op. 10.		Op. 198 (Th. 359, 1017)
ἀγευδής Th. 233		166, 155 121 140 156
νημερτής Th. 235, 262	κρύπτειν	Op 47 138 50 42 386 471
ψευδές Th. 227. 229 783		Th 482 114 730 157
Op. 78 789 709 283.		

⁷⁵ Points 1–5 have been entirely crossed out.

⁷⁶ The left top corner of the sheet is missing.

Problematic character of the praise of wealth and the blame of poverty.

640 ff.—Hes. no sailor!

b) Connection of teaching with private affair of Hes.

(37-40; 633 ff.) (394-404) 641 ff.

Perseus the beggar

father turns from sailing to farming—but what about Hes. himself?

king δωροφάγοι (39 221 213)

a) the trial:	Perseus	-father	-Hesiod
	drone	bee	singer
νήπιος	ἐσθλός	πανάριστος	107

The turn from cattle-raising to singing Theog. 26 and Opp. 633 ff. 286

ἀοιδός ≠ πτωχός Opp. 26 801

ἀοιδός ≠ βασιλεύς Opp. 210

β)

favoured singer Opp. 20-26 begging = ἐπέων νομός 399 403

νήπιος μεμνημένος ἀντὸς νοήσις 293 ff. βασιλεὺς πλουτοδοταί 126


(cf. 40 ff.) ἐσθλός Stingless drones Opp. 304
(cf. on the other hand Th. 595).

Hes. does not invoke the Muses when sp

The work is devoted to the settling of the dispute: 35 f. is there anything said about the outcome of the κρίσις?⁷⁷

Pleading with ἔρις—a contest between βασιλεύς and ἀοιδός

6. Genealogy of the Muses. Theogony—Muses its most important topic.



Daughters of μνημοσύνη—πόνος brother of λήθη

⁷⁷ End of the crossed-out part.

Gold = good people of heroic age
(Bronze = Iron: Th. 764)

Prometheus etc. belong to the age of Kronos.

Ten years of Titanic war and ten years of Trojan war...

7)⁸⁰ Ambiguity of teaching concerning justice

is justice rewarded? 270 ff. Cf. 180-201. But 175 f. Hes' real reason for justice: 265 f.

*[earlier plan
verso]*


Δικη half-sister of the Muses 257 ff.—cf. Theog. 901-906

Δικη is κεκαλυμμένη⁸¹

220 ff. Cf. 198. 255. 125. 155.

Cf. 230 with description
of golden age.

The autobiographic story shows
that injustice did succeed
in the present case.



What is the relation of θεμις and δικη—

Opp. 137, 219, 221, 230.

Th. 85, 235.

10)⁸² Εργα και Ημεραι—ήμέραι treated already under the heading of ἔργα (504. 488. 565. 633)

ἔργα are not the real subject

Επη και νύκτης—560 729 f. 764

ἔργον ≠ ἔπος 710. 760-764. 453 f.

βουλαι ὁδός; cf. 288. 290. 216 / 29-38 ἀγορα = speech ᔍργα ≠ ὁδός 579-581.

What about the rules in⁸³ the last part of Εργα and in Ημεραι

⁸⁰ 8) corrected to 7) on the manuscript

⁸¹ “concealed”

⁸² 9) corrected to 10)

⁸³ <under> in

9) Hes' remarks about speech: 719 f. 722 f. 788 f.

ενι θυμῷ ≠ μύθῳ Il. B 223 f.

[Working Notes on Hesiod's *Works and Days* and *Theogony*]⁸⁴

[1st sheet] ⁸⁵<ὑπονοία a hidden thought Xen. Symp. 3, 6 and Rep. 378D>

<φήμη voice and saying of uncertain origin>

<a saying we report (spread away)>

Μοῦσαι Op. 1, 658, 662) Sc. 206.⁸⁶

Th. 1, 25, 36, 52, 75, 93 f. 96 106 114 916 966 1022

<Protag. 316D>

<Arist. Metaph. 1000a9> <Heraklit 12 B40 and 57.⁸⁷>

[2nd sheet] Zeus Th. 2. 11. 13. 25. 29. 36. 54. 51 f. 76 81 96

104

286

316 328 348 386 399

412 428 465 468 498

513 514 520 537 545 550 558 561 580

601 613 639 669 687

708 730 735 784

815 820 853 886 893 899

904 914 920 944 952 966

⁸⁴ These notes are handwritten in pencil on unnumbered sheets, mostly of the same type as the workplans. They are presented here in the order in which they occur in the file. Three pieces of paper, in which the text has been entirely crossed out, have been left aside here.

⁸⁵ Text written on a lined card.

⁸⁶ I.e., Scutum (shield).

⁸⁷ Ordering number 12 indicates that Strauss used an edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. Hermann Diels (1st ed. Berlin: Weidmann, 1903), earlier than the 5th (revised by Walther Kranz, 1934–37).

1002	1022	
Opp. 4.8.36.47	51 f. 53.69.79	99
104 f.	122 138 143 158 168	180
229 239 247	256 259 267 273 281	
333		379
	465	488
548	565	
626 638	668 676	
724	765	769
Perses	10 27 (184) 213 274 286 299 393 ff.	611 633 641. (311 ff.)

Kings (38-40 (126). 202 (221) 248 263 f. (189)

(650) 668 (298 f.)

Muses	1f. (658, 662).	<βασιλεύς>
<Father (84, 59) (122) (33 ff.)		<δωροφάγοι 38 f. 210-264>
<βασιλεύς Opp. 668 261 302 38 248. 263>	<126>	<αλεξικακοι ⁸⁸ >
Th.		<πλουτοδοταί 126>
<Law-suit 9 f. (30 f.) 34-39 269-273>	<φρονεοῦσιν 202>	
	<Ζεύς βασιλεύς 668 Th. 79 ff.>	

<614: opp. Perses to father.>

<Perses not the addressee of the whole work: cf. 695 ff. with 399.>

<Perses no longer mentioned after 641>

⁸⁸ This word (“averting mischief”) is not printed in every edition: see the Loeb edition and Wilamowitz, *Hesiodos Erga*.

Direct speeches

Zeus addresses Prometheus 54-58 (brought out clearer by 69) cf. 453 f. 503

Hawk addresses Nightingale 202 ff.

<Perseus has used up his money for the law-suit—he is no longer in a position to bribe the judges—thus, he has already lost>

Perses is mentioned 10 times

νήπιος

40 131 218 286 397 456 633

[4th sheet] <1. Do your work at the proper time, or else you will remain poor 383-404

2. Acquisition of the instruments: house, slave power, and ox 405-457

3. Ploughing 458-492 ἔρδειν 35 136 708 710

4. Winter 493-563 327 336 362 382 760

5. Harvesting 564-617> ἔρδειν (do) has two meanings:

- a) generally: do
- b) specially: offer sacrifice

1. Anrede an Muses und Perses (I-10) Accordingly:
a) ἔργα in the general sense = 383-694

2. Eris and application (11-41) b) ἔργα in the special sense (cf. 334)

3. Prometheus (42-105) = 694-764 cf. 826 ff.

4. Five Ages (106-201)

5. Hawk, nightingale (202-212)

6. Justice (213-28)

7. Two ways (ἀρετή—κακότης) (286-297)

8. The right way of acquiring wealth (298-382)

9. The farmer's year	(383-617)	
a) do your work at proper time, or else you will remain poor	383-404	
b) acquisition of the instruments house, women and ox	405-457	ξργα
c) ploughing	458-492	
d) winter	493-563	
e) harvesting	564-617	
10. Sailing and trading	(618-694)	
11. a) Wife	(695-705)	
b) gods	(706	
c) brother—friend	(707-716)	
d) guests and talking	(718-723)	
e) Veneration of gods	(724-759)	
and hiding or purity		
f) φήμη	(760-764)	

12. Ἡμέραι

P.T.O.⁸⁹

Ἡμέραι

	Wise	Midmonth	Great twentieth
Holy:	1, 4 and 7	6?	
Good:	8.9		
	11		
	12		
	13?		

⁸⁹ "Please turn over" (verso of the same sheet).

[5th sheet] Esoteric.

<Recommendation of work—blame of begging—begging is talking, is ἐπέων νομός (pasture of words expenditure of words)⁹⁰—

it does not lead to χρειῶν λύσις⁹¹ (393-403)

[But what is the author himself doing? He talks—cf. 26: πτωχός and ἀοιδός]

Hesiod's and Perses' father sailed because he was poor (633 f.)—

<u>642-662</u>	Perses does not work—he uses unjust means, he is a king. Hesiod does not work—he is a <u>singer</u> .
----------------	--

The conditional character of the advice—cf. 618 and 641 f.

Πενίη is μακάρων δόσιν αἰὲν ἔοντων 718.⁹²

"Ἐργα καὶ ἡμέραι—he speaks of the ἡμέτα already in the part devoted to the ἔργα
504 488. 565 663>⁹³

<νύκτες 729 f.—cf. 764—560>

μεμνήσθαι [→ Μοῦσαι] 616. 422 491 f. 623. 641 f. 711. 728 297 f. 274 (cf. 204 ff.)

μεμνημενος Opp. 298, 422, 616, 623, 641, 711, 728

Th. 562. 103. 651.

<ἔργον ≠ ὁδός 579-581> Th. 503: ἀπομιμνήσκομαι.

<cf. the name ἡσίοδος—cf. Introd. p. XIV⁹⁴)>

<ἔργον ≠ ἔπος 770. 760-764>

⁹⁰ See *Works and Days*, v. 403.

⁹¹ "release from debts"

⁹² Poverty is "a gift of the blessed ones who always are."

⁹³ The whole text of the upper part of the page has been crossed out.

⁹⁴ I.e., to the edition in the Loeb Classical Library, Hesiod: *The Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London: Heinemann, 1914).

Kyme in kleinasiat. Aeolis gegenüber Lesbos⁹⁵

[6th sheet]

die Einwohner waren wegen ihrer Gutmütigkeit verspottet—

Strabo XIII 622 σκώπτεται δ'εις ἀναισθησίαν ἡ Κύμη.⁹⁶

Vita Hom. 7 ed. West.⁹⁷

Hesiod: calls Pieria, Helikon

Περμησσός

Eleuther (Th. 54) is in Boeotia, it is nearer to Ascra and Helikon than is the Olympus.

διον γενος I 538.⁹⁸ <T 124⁹⁹> <π 401¹⁰⁰>

Works and Days

[7th sheet]

a) the various works of agriculture, of sailing <with an “if” 645> 383-

farming Main stress on sailing

the proper season for harvesting, ploughing, cutting wood

what to do in summer or winter

b) Days—days which are good for certain things and
which are bad (superstition)

Addressed to Perses who does not work, but goes begging to other men's houses,
and in particular to Hesiod (394-396).

⁹⁵ “Kyme in Aeolis, in Asia Minor, facing Lesbos. The inhabitants were mocked for their good-heartedness.” Strauss relies on Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. “Kyme,” col. 2475. Kyme is said to be the birthplace of Hesiod’s father and of Homer.

⁹⁶ “Cyme is ridiculed for its stupidity” (trans. H. L. Jones, *The Geography of Strabo*, vol. 6 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929]).

⁹⁷ In *BΙΟΓΡΑΦΟΙ. Vitarum scriptores graeci minores*, ed. A. Westermann (Brunsvigae, 1845). Cf. pseudo-Herodotus, “On Homer’s Origins,” 9, in *Homeric Hymns*, trans. M. L. West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁹⁸ *Iliad* IX.538.

⁹⁹ *Iliad* XIX.124.

¹⁰⁰ *Odyssey* XVI.401.

Hesiod's brother (633)—the father of Hesiod and Perses sailed on shipboard because he lacked sufficient livelihood (633 f.)

A praise of Zeus—the poet invokes the Muses to praise their father Zeus—the most powerful god (cf. 1-8)

Connection between Zeus (or the gods) and “Works and Days”:

the work is ordained for men by the gods (398)

the days are indicated by the gods (394) 414-416 483-488...

the works and days are dependent on the gods, especially on Zeus, who “rains”

the days from Zeus 765.

General admonition to work and blame of idleness (393-404).

Industry leads to wealth (411)

οῖκος and πόλις—the οῖκος first—404 f.	god 706
	friends 707-716
	—speech 714-721
	friends 722-723
	god 724-727
	—uncovering 728-736
	god 737-759
	—Avoid talk of men 760-764
<A. 1) farming 383-617	B. Days 765-828.
2) sailing 618-694	
and trading	
3) marriage 695-705	
4) Various rules concerning intercourse with gods and men 706-764	
the rules concerning intercourse with men have <u>mainly or eventually</u> to do with talk>	

Content [of Works and] ¹⁰¹ Days—i.e. the works to be done and the proper seasons for the various works. [8th sheet]

But: a praise of Zeus (1 ff.) | addressed to Perses, the unjust brother

What is the connection? The advice as to the particular works to be done is based on a general admonition to work, a praise of work as such and a blame of idleness.

Idleness leads to injustice

Work leads to justice or virtue¹⁰², and Zeus is the guardian of justice (cf. 36)

Now, Zeus being the guardian of justice, has arranged things in such a way that man must work, and that man's work is rewarded.

1) Th 2 ἔριδες—cf. 803 f.

The deeper teaching: work is the outcome of the ἀγαθὴ ἔρις the elder daughter of Night, and Zeus set her in the roots of the earth.

idleness is the outcome of the blameworthy ἔρις, which is identical with injustice.

But is not the distinction fictitious? Of the bad one he says, that no mortal loves her, “but of necessity, through the will of the deathless gods, men honour¹⁰³ harsh Strife.”¹⁰⁴ Besides, the good ἔρις provokes not only ζῆλος, but also ἡδονή.¹⁰⁵ Above all, Theog. 116 ff. and 211 ff.

And the ambiguous nature of the advice is given in 27-41

Ἐρις is the mother of Πόνος as well as of Λήθη [Λήθη is opposed to Μνήμη].

The poet goes on to show that work is the outcome of a curse, of divine vengeance [for human attempt to be wise—if men were really wise, that vengeance would

¹⁰¹ The left top corner of the sheet has partly disappeared, and a few words are missing.

¹⁰² [Written below:] “or virtue”

¹⁰³ <pay> honour

¹⁰⁴ Works and Days, vv. 15f. (trans. Evelyn-White modified by Strauss).

¹⁰⁵ The manuscript reads: ἡδονός.

not have been possible—but how can man escape the curse of work? Contradiction—40 f.¹⁰⁶

The poet then shows that there is a necessity to work—the gods keep life hidden from men—as a punishment of Prometheus' theft of the fire—but for the fact that the gods keep “life” hidden from men, not much work were needed. Prometheus would have made such a life possible by stealing the fire—if Epimetheus would not have been such a fool—i.e. a Promethean human race would not have to work—Epimetheus and Pandora the Woman (who has not learned the arts of Athena) Pandora—the καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ’ ἀγαθοῖο¹⁰⁷ (sc. the fire) (Theogony 585). and Works, 57-58

Hesiod's own teaching concerning the Muses

[9th sheet] 1) their mother is Memory (54, 915)—the power which inspires Hesiod, descends from memory.

Cf. Bacon, Advancement of learning, p. m.¹⁰⁸ 69 Ab. 2

This shows us why it is dangerous to call Hesiod a poet.

But: not the Muses are Memory, <not of>

<B cf. fr. 1¹¹⁰ the son of Urania is Linus παντοίη σοφία>

cf. Heraklit B40¹⁰⁹

πολυμαθίη, but not νόος

attributed to Hesiod,

Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hekataios

¹⁰⁶ This paragraph is written at the bottom of the page, with an insertion mark.


¹⁰⁷ “beautiful evil thing instead of a good one”

¹⁰⁸ “penes me,” i.e., “in my possession”; “Ab.” = Absatz (paragraph). “The *parts* of human learning have reference to the three parts of man’s understanding, which is the seat of learning: *history* to his *memory*, *poesy* to his *imagination*, and *philosophy* to his *reason*. Divine learning receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit of man is the same, though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse: so as theology consisteth also of the *history* of the church; of *parables*, which is divine *poesy*; and of holy *doctrine* or *precept*: for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is *prophecy*, it is but Divine History; which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration may be before the fact as well as after” (Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, ed. G. W. Kitchin [London: Dent, 1915], 69).

¹⁰⁹ “Much learning [πολυμαθίη] does not teach intelligence [νόος]: for otherwise it would have taught it to Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again to Xenophanes and Hecataeus” (trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most, in *Early Greek Philosophy*, vol. 3 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016], 147).

¹¹⁰ “So Urania bare Linus, a very lovely son: and him all men who are singers and harpers do bewail at feasts and dances, and as they begin and as they end they call on Linus * * * who was skilled in all

2) More on the genealogy of the Muses



All genealogies have this in common:
the Muses are descendants from
Earth and Heaven—i.e. not
descendants from mortal men—
according to the later genealogies,
they are not even descendants from
the Olympian gods—they are

²⁾ The Muses address Hes. in the 2nd pers. plur. (Th. 24)—this indicates that “the Muses” are as little a plurality as is the poet.

manner of wisdom” (trans. Evelyn-White, from Diogenes Laertius, VIII.25 and Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* I.121).

¹¹¹ See *RE*, col. 684 ff., 724.

¹¹² Lit. “through violence and hands” (*Works and Days*, v. 321).

¹¹³ *Hesiodi Carmina*, ed. Aloisius Rzach (Leipzig: Teubner revised ed. 1908). The series of references on the left side of the page has been circled with a red pencil.

descendants from Earth and Heaven via the Sea (travelling: Odysseus). Note that Nereus is truthful! 233 ff.¹¹⁴ The expression of what various people do, the memory of it—

i.e. the memory of the customs
(νόμοι) of various people—
(cf. Th. 66, fr. 20¹¹⁵)—νόμος not
yet in Homer!—(νόμον διέταξα
Opp. 276—we may therefore translate: "law")¹¹⁶

Note that Rhea (> ρέιν) the product of the Muses even according to the first genealogy!¹¹⁷

[10th sheet] <The teaching of Hes. seems then to be based on the teaching of the Muses—but not everything he says: he emphasizes his lack of experience concerning sailing, but he does not say anything of that kind when speaking of farming. He speaks of the Muses twice: he asks them to praise Zeus (1) and he owes them his knowledge of sailing (658). All other teachings, we may assume, are his own, based on his own observation.

There is, however, a third source: "what people say" (φασι) 802-804. Who? All men? No—"few" (814-828)—but it appears to be a doubtful wisdom—825. Cf. 803 (φασι) with 814, 820 (παῦροι ἴσασι¹¹⁸).

What the Muses say, we may presume, is reliable, is most important—but what about the reliability of what Hesiod says in his own name? "I would tell the truth" (= I hope to tell the truth) (10).>

<A case where Hesiod voices a doubt, or a hope: 270-273. His doubt is understandable—for he does not know Διὸς νόος. But do not the Muses guarantee him the unflinching justice of Zeus? How is it possible that such a doubt arises in a work

¹¹⁴ This last sentence is written at the bottom of the page, with an insertion mark at this point in the text.

¹¹⁵ "Howsoever the city does sacrifice, the ancient custom [νόμος] is best" (trans. Evelyn-White, from Porphyry, *De abstinentia* II.18).

¹¹⁶ This sentence is written to the left of the following crossed-out text and seems intended to replace it: <cf. Theog. 66, fr. 20—νόμος not yet in Homer! Op. 276 Th. 417 Op. 388 fr. 1—Urania's son has παντοὶ σοφία>

¹¹⁷ An insertion mark appears before this sentence written at the bottom of the page, however the place of insertion within the text is not indicated.

¹¹⁸ "few know"

which opens with <a praise of Zeus Lycaios> an invocation of the Muses to praise Zeus?

To answer this question, we must discuss

Hes' teaching of the Muses (in the *Theogony*)>

<A case where H. voices a doubt, or a hope: 270-273. But in the whole context (225-285) he emphasizes that Zeus punishes the wicked. We can understand that he has his doubts—for he is a man who does not know Διὸς νόος—but why does he assert definitely the justice of Zeus? Does he rely for it on what the Muses taught him? If so, why is he not fully convinced?>¹¹⁹

C.

To answer this question, we must consider the >teaching of the *Theogony* concerning the Muses. For <the *Theogony*> not only is the teaching of the *Theogony* based on what the Muses say (75, 104, 114, 966, 1021), that teaching is largely devoted to the praise of the Muses: the Muses “bade me sing of the race of the blessed gods that are ever, but ever to sing of themselves both first and last”¹²⁰ (33 f.; cf. the beginning and the end).

What is the teaching peculiar to Hesiod, concerning the Muses? He has much more to say about them than Homer before him. From Homer we learn that the Muse (or the Muses) is the goddess, daughter of Zeus, and that they inhabit the Olympian dwellings, that they are always present and therefore in a position to know everything and that they transmit the knowledge of theirs to the singers they love. We may even say that we learn from Homer that there are 9 Muses (but the passage in Od. XXIV is generally considered <to be> spurious).

3) We have seen that while Hes. sticks to the traditional view that the Muses are [11th sheet] daughters of Zeus and that they inhabit Olympus, he makes that traditional view doubtful—the Muses are not necessarily descendants from Olympian gods, but from Earth, Heaven and Sea.

Moreover, he does not speak unambiguously of the Muses as the inhabitants of the Olympus—he invokes¹²¹ the Muses of Piera (Opp. 1) and the Muses of Helikon (Opp. 658) (in the Opp. they never are called Olympian Muses).

¹¹⁹ The whole text on this page has been crossed out up to this point.

¹²⁰ Trans. Evelyn-White; “eternally” is replaced by “ever” (first occurrence).

¹²¹ <calls> invokes

<Zeus entered Mnemosyne's holy bed, aloof from the deathless ones, where he begot the Muses (Th. 56 f.)> They were born in Piera (Th. 53), in Thessaly, and they were begotten in the holy bed of Memory, aloof from the deathless ones" (Th. 56); they were born "a little away from the topmost peak of snowy Olympus" (Th. 62).¹²² Thus, their relation to Olympus becomes doubtful.

They are called Helikonian Muses—near Helikon, Ascra is situated, the little village in which Hesiod's father settled, in which Hes. was born and, at any rate, lived—(Opp. 633-640. Th. 22-25)—

i.e. the Muses are nearer to the dwelling of Hesiod than to the dwelling of Zeus!

<4.¹²³ The Muses dance upon Helikon; thence they go abroad by night, <veiled> hidden by thick mist. Th. 9-10.¹²⁴

The interpretation of that passage is supplied by what the Muses say in their revelation to Hesiod:

Th. 27-28: “We understand to say many lie similar to truth.

We also understand to utter truth, whenever we will.”

may consist of lies <simile> <which look as if they were true>

That is to say the teaching of the Muses is not necessarily true—it <is> <a mixture of truths and lies.

—“the Muses go abroad by night, hidden by thick mist.”—it is a mixture of truths and lies.>

D.

<The teaching of the Muses is ambiguous—Hesiod famous for his ambiguities (cf. Agon p.m. 574¹²⁵) where Homer recites the ambiguous statements of Hesiod unambiguously.

The clue for the understanding of Hesiod: there are two sources of his teaching—his own experience and the teaching of the Muses.

¹²² The second quotation is from the translation of Evelyn-White.

¹²³ From here, the text of the lower part of this page has been entirely crossed out.


¹²⁴ Trans. Evelyn-White, slightly modified.

¹²⁵ *The Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, in Evelyn-White, *Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homeric*.


as regards his own knowledge: Opp. 10 (the optative¹²⁶)

as regards the Muses: Theog. 27-28—cf. 270-273
with the whole context (225-285)

as regards φασι—cf. 803 (φασι), but 814, 820 (παῦροι ἵσασι)
814-828>



¹²⁶ Strauss seems here to follow Wilamowitz (*Hesiodos Erga*, 136). The Greek optative mood is used to express wish.



1. The Muses praise Zeus Hera Athena Apollon Artemis Poseidon Themis Aphrodite Hebe Diane Leto Japetos Cronos Eos Helois Selene Gaia Okeanos Nyx etc. 11-21.

αἰὲν ἔόντων 21.
 ἐσσόμενα πρὸ ἔόντα ≠ μακάροι αἰὲν ἔόντων 32-37
 ἔόντα ἐσσόμενα πρὸ ἔόντα 38.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ "who always are"

"things that will be ≠ blessed ones who always are"

"things that are things that will be things that were before"

2. a) Gaia¹²⁸ and Okeanos parents and grandparents of gods
 b) Zeus father of gods and men (45-50)
 c) men and giants

3) a) Children of Earth and strong heaven, of Night, and of Sea, Praise them!
 b) Tell how the gods came into being and earth and rivers and sea and stars and heaven
 c) Occupation of Olympus 105-114
 d) What came first into being?

The Muses praise

P.T.O.

Starting-point: Ζεὺς Κρονιών

Zeus has a father, Kronos—who is his mother? who are the father and mother of Kronos? Uranus and Gaia—who is the father of Uranus... .

Zeus is the king of gods and men—he must be the son of a king—there must have been a time when Kronos reigned:

Age of Kronos in the past—age of Zeus at the present time.

Glorious past or dreadful past: wonderful age of Kronos—Opp. 106 ff.—a short version of the Theogony.

dreadful age of Kronos: Theog.

The good Perses—if the age of Kronos was wonderful, his successor was a criminal.

The wise
Perses

if the age of Kronos was dreadful, his successor is the saviour: Kronos committed the gravest crimes—he castrated his father and swallowed his children [But Zeus maltreats his father, too, and he swallows his wife <child with> Metis] Th. 886 ff. [Kronos as well as Zeus are youngest sons] s. 888 with 468; 891 with 463; 892 f. with 461 f.

The crimes of Gaia and Uranos

Zeus the father of the Muses and of Dike

¹²⁸ <children and grandchildren of> Gaia

<u>Theog.</u> in princ.: 4 <u>crucial</u> things	youngest sons:
(Chaos, Earth, Tartaros, Eros)	Kronos of Gaia and Uranus
	Zeus of Kronos and Rhea
	Typhoeus of Gaia
	and Tartaros 821.
Night — Day → Πόνος	
	Eris — Μάχαι

The Theog. presents the oldest things, the unknown things in a disguised way—it presents the oldest things as they had to be if Zeus' coming to power shall be looked upon as a blessing. Consequently, not Okeanos at the beginning, but Earth.

The four primeval beings: Chaos, Earth, Tartaros, Eros. (115-122) Progeniture of Sea (233-370)

Progeniture of Chaos and Night (123-125) Styx and Hecate (382-452)

Progeniture of Earth and Heaven (126-210) Rhea and Cronos (453 ff.)

Progeniture of Night and Eris (211-232)

Cf. the theogony of the Ilias, according to which Okeanos and Tethys are the parents¹²⁹ of all things

Ilias O 187-193: 3 sons of Kronos divide the world among themselves

Gaia—farming—das, woraus die Erde geworden ist, wird von Hesiod nicht gesagt—d.h. die eigentliche ἀρχή bleibt ungenannt.¹³⁰

Ocean—sailing—Styx ist am Rande der Erde und in der Tiefe der Erde¹³¹—cf. Ilias Θ 14, 478 ff. (Tartaros)—cf. Phorkys 270.

Πῦρ—in Ilias Φ 330-384 siegt Hephaistos (πῦρ) über Skamandros (ὕδωρ)¹³² cf. Tuphoeus; cf. βίος—πῦρ in Ἔργα.

„Cosmologie“—Nennen der ältesten Dinge, der ungeborenen Dinge: die Götter sind nicht das Älteste → der Ursprung der Götter die Geburt der Götter.¹³³

¹²⁹ <fathers> parents

¹³⁰ “that, whence the Earth has come, is not said by Hesiod—i.e. the true ἀρχή remains unnamed.”

¹³¹ “Styx is at the edge of the Earth and in the depth of the Earth.”

¹³² “in *Iliad* XXI 330–384 Hephaistos (fire) wins over Scamandros (water).”

¹³³ “Cosmology”—naming the oldest things, the unborn things: the gods are not the oldest → the

Was ist Weisheit → der Ursprung der Musen.¹³⁴

Plato, Tim: die Geburt der sichtbaren Götter—Erde, Himmel sind nicht die älteste Dinge—ironische Verwerfung von Hesiod: <Zeus> „der Vater“ ist älter als Himmel und Erde.¹³⁵

Theog.

[13th sheet]

- 1) The Muses praise Zeus, Hera, Athena, . . . Iapetos, Kronos, Eos, Helios, Selene, Gaia, Okeanos, Nyx (11-21).
- 2) The Muses praise
 - a) the children and grandchildren of Gaia and Uranos
 - b) Zeus
 - c) men and giants (44-52)
- 3) The Muse praise
 - a) former men
 - b) Olympian gods (100-101)
- 4) Hesiod asks the Muses: a) to praise the immortal race produced by earth, heaven, night, and sea
 - b) to tell of the genesis of gods and earth cf. 117 f.¹³⁶ and rivers and sea and stars and heaven and of the gods descendant from them, and of how they first took Olympus. 104-115.

The Muses enabled Hes. to praise τὰ τ'έσσομενα πρὸ ἔόντα, and they asked him to praise μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἔόντων (32-33).¹³⁷

The Muses tell of things that are and that shall be and that were aforetime (36)

I.e.: Hesiod could tell of the truth of the ἔόντα without any Music support.

He refuses, however, to do this (cf. 104-115).

origin of the gods the birth of the gods”

¹³⁴ “What is wisdom → the origin of the Muses”

¹³⁵ “the birth of the visible gods—Earth, Heaven are not the oldest things—ironical blame of Hesiod: the Father is older than Earth and Heaven.”

¹³⁶ Reference written below the paragraph with an insertion mark.

¹³⁷ “the things that will be and that were before,” “the race of the blessed ones who always are”

He hides εἰπεῖν τὰ αἱὲν ἔόντα¹³⁸ by a praise of Zeus.

Praise of Zeus = son of Kronos . . . and deprecation of the ancestors of Zeus.

Why does he lay such stress on the earth as the origin of all? The earth is the origin of the gods, and in this respect of all; and it is one of the elements. By starting from the earth, he catches 2 flies:

- a) he makes clear that the earth is older than the gods
- b) he makes clear that the earth more than anything else is the origin of the gods

and c) he deprecates the pre-Olympian ἀρχή.

Chaos represents heaven: Chaos → αἰθήρ


Tartaros represents sea [but: ἔρεβος!]

1) Hes.' "cosmology" = εἰπεῖν τὰ αἱὲν ἔόντα—Earth Heaven Sea + Ερως

2) Earth, Rivers, Sea, Stars and Heaven are no gods (104-115).

To them, we had to add: Night

P.T.O.




¹³⁸ "telling the things that always are"

¹³⁹ The top left corner of this page has disappeared; only the last two letters of "Chaos" remain. To the left of "black Night" "Erebos" was most likely written.

¹⁴⁰ A line above this one has been crossed out: <Oceanos Themis Mnemosyne—Kronos—Cyclops>

Night	The descendants of Uranos
/	a) Erinyes, Giants, Melian Nymphs
<u>ἀπάθη καὶ φιλότης</u>	b) Aphrodite (accompanied by Eros and Himeros)
<u>ἔρις</u>	Cronos—Rhea
	Demeter Hera Poseidon Zeus
<u>ἔρις</u> → πόνος λήθη ψεύδης λόγος	Iapetos—Clymena, daughter of Ocean
ἀμφιλογία δυσνομίη	Atlas Prometheus Epimetheus



Kronos is ἀγκυλομήτης Th. 18, 137 u.ö.¹⁴¹

[14th sheet]

Zeus is μητιέτα 56.

Earth thinks a crafty, an evil vile 160.



Cf. Plato, Theaet.

¹⁴¹ ἀγκυλομήτης = "ill-advised"; "u.ö" = und öfter (et passim)

[15th sheet] 142

<Zeus

Muses (Th. 80-100)

Hes. calls the Muses twice:
as regards sailing and Zeus—

days and works night; words and ways not as regards agriculture!>

Πονός brother of Ληθη die Leiterin Musen.¹⁴³

Ares not mentioned at the beginning of Theog. Cf. Agon on Hes.' victory over Homer (p.m. p. 586)

What do the ἔργα say about the right intercourse between men as regards speech?

Esot. teaching of Theog.: Gaia die höchste der Götter

Soph. Antig. 330 ff.

[16th sheet] ¹⁴⁴Tate, Plato and Allegorical Interpretation

(Classical Quarterly, 1929/30)

v. 23

“. . . Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Anaximander are mentioned in Xenophon as among the many teachers from whom Niceratus had learned the hidden meanings ($\bar{\nu}\pi\bar{\nu}\bar{\nu}\bar{\nu}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}\bar{\alpha}$) of Homer.” p. 143

"This analysis makes it clear that in Republic 378d Plato offers no opinion whatever on the question whether the myths of Homer and Hesiod do or do not contain allegorical meaning." p. 146

[The question of the *úπόνοιαι* discussed as question of allegory of myths—]

Cratylus 396d—cf. Ion 533d ff., Protag. 347e.

v. 24, p. 6: Socrates' remark in *Sympos.* 3, 6 <or 4,6> "is obviously ironical."

¹⁴² Lower part of a torn-up piece of paper.

¹⁴³ “The guiding Muses”

¹⁴⁴ This small sheet bears the following printed heading:

Hamilton College
Clinton, New York

Leo Strauss, "Hesiod and Pre-Socratics"

7.9.1939¹

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INTRODUCTION.²

1. Philosophy and history of philosophy

What is philosophy? What is political philosophy?³

Philosophy is the attempt to replace opinions about God, world and man by evident knowledge, or science, of God, world and man. (The problematic distinction between philosophy and science as a body of established knowledge—that distinction a product of the 18th century).

¹ Leo Strauss Papers, Box 6, Folder 7, composition notebook, 27 pp. Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. The text is written in pen on numbered right pages; some notes or portions of text are written on left pages, in pen or pencil. The title and date are written on the cover. Common abbreviations have been developed without comment. <> indicate the crossed-out portions of text in the manuscript. All the footnotes are the work of the editor, except for the notes numbered 1) which are by Strauss.

² [Written in pencil on the left page:]

Before I start, I wish to ask you for a favour—I am a foreigner, and you find difficult sometimes to understand me—will you please not hesitate to interrupt me at once if and when you cannot follow me because of my pronunciation or for any other reason.—I am expected to give here a course on history of Greek philos. from the beginning down to Plato with special regard to pol. philosophy. In the way of an introduction, I would discuss with you 3 points:

Introduction

1. Theory of history of philos.
2. Place of the Greeks in the history of philos.
3. Prephilos. Greek thought.

³ [Sentence written on the right, in pencil:] To find a definition which is sufficiently broad without being colorless—a definition which, if it is bound to be incomplete, suits for the whole tradition of philos. rather than contemporary thought.

Political philosophy is the attempt to replace opinions about political things by evident knowledge, or science, of political things.

The hindrances to philosophy: unwillingness to face the truth; belief that we know the truth without serious exertion; attachment to cherished opinions, to opinions hallowed by tradition—fearlessness and modesty characteristic of the philosopher.

Philosophy is essentially unhistorical—i.e. the philosophic questions are essentially unhistorical: the philosopher wants to know the truth, and not, what this or that man, or this or that nation thought about the truth.

And yet we find that the philosophers of about all times are concerned with the views of philosophers of the past. Why?

- a) Scholasticism: a certain philosopher of the past is considered to be the authority.
- b) Dogmatic approval: truth discovered by modern science—progress—demonstration of progress—
 - a) and b) presuppose that we know the truth.
- c) Historical: understanding the philosophies of the past for their own sake—not so much as attempts to find the truth, rather as expressions of the human soul, or of the social-political situation, or of folk-mind.
- d) Philosophic: the philosophic student who is interested in the truth only, studies the philosophies of the past because he thinks he may learn something from them.

Prejudices and tradition: freeing the mind from our prejudices by becoming familiar with another set of prejudices.

- 2. Periods of history of philosophy and of political philosophy: ancient, medieval, and modern.
 - a) ancient: vulgar language—free cities and citizens⁴—no holy scriptures, but poems—political character of almost everything except science which is private—central political issue: oligarchy—democracy, i.e. constitution: constitution prior to laws (relative insignificance of natural law).


⁴ [A mark refers to the following note which has been written with a pencil on the left page:]
Citizenship = participation in rule

City = body of citizens—no “state.” State > status respubl. > Constitution.
the most important city, Athens, a democracy.
the Rome of Cicero's time a fairly democratic commonwealth.

b) medieval: Latin—territorial states (monarchies), feudalism and chivalry—authority of Bible and Church: science subject to authorities, Bible or Aristotle—philosophers and monks teaching in universities controlled by the Church—central political issue: Church and State; constitution no longer central, but natural law.

c) modern:⁵ vulgar language (transition: Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes)—territorial states and cities, variety of constitutions—no longer authorities—“private” philosophy in 17th and 18th century, but university philosophy in 19th century—economics a modern science—central political issue: sovereign state and rights of the individual. Medieval philosophy based on classical philosophy: theological superstructure on philosophic substructure—modern philosophy effects a break away from classical basis. Therefore, [2]

3. Relation of modern and classical philosophy—comparison of ancient and modern division of philosophy



Modern philosophy is much more concerned with Man than is ancient philosophy.⁶

This is shown in political philosophy also: Natural law and Rights of Man.

Practical character of modern thought: ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—

Im Anfang war die Tat.⁷

(scientia propter potentiam⁸—maîtres et possesseurs de la nature⁹

—primacy of practical reason—Hume, Treatise, I, 5 Abs.2).

4. Greeks are the founders of philosophy and of political philos. Why? What kind of people were the Greeks?

⁵ [An arrow refers to the following note, written in pencil on the left page:] transition from monarchy to republicanism democracy

⁶ [Written in pencil in the margin:] cf. Fuller p. 7 top. [B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Holt, 1938)]

⁷ “In the beginning was the word” (John 1:1)—“In the beginning was the deed” (Goethe, *Faust I*, v. 1237).

⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *De corpore* 1.1.6.

⁹ Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, chap. 6.

Athenians fond of “talking and hearing news” (Acts 17, 21).
 “Greeks are always children” (Timaeus): no old traditions which are absolutely respected.
 Middle between Northern rudeness and Asiatic slavery (Aristotle).
 Ἰονδαῖοις σκάνδαλον, Ελλησι δὲ μωρία (Paul)¹⁰—no fanatics, fond of laughter.

Curiosity and freedom.

Why founders of political philosophy? Greeks were the greatest military power of the Western world—but this is not enough: neither Egyptians, nor Babylonians, nor Persians elaborated political science.

Decisive reason: they were much more political, much more citizens than earlier people.

Political > πόλις = city ≠ town—but city life is urban life, no village life, no tribal life (πόλεις ≠ ἔθνη—Greeks κατὰ πόλεις, Barbarians κατὰ ἔθνη in Homer).

Πόλις = body of citizens—political body = participating in rule (citizens, not subjects)

Greek variety of constitutions—typical change: kingdom—aristocracy—tyranny democracy—oligarchy

Not a¹¹ single divinity gives law, but many laws the human origin of which would not escape people’s notice.

5. Periods of Greek philosophy: Presocratic—Socrates and his pupils—postsocratic.

¹² How their works have been preserved—fragments of Pre-Socratics, Stoics Epicurus
 Complete works of Plato and Xenophon—many works of Aristotle are preserved.

[3] Difficulty of interpreting fragments: fragments may have been selected because of their peculiar beauty. Most important: Aristotle and his commentators.

Definition of philosophy: attempt to replace opinions about God, world and man by science,¹³ or evident knowledge of, God, world and man.

This implies that man has opinions before he has science or evident knowledge, or, that man originally lives in a world of opinions (Plato’s simile of the cave).

¹⁰ “scandal for the Jews, madness for the Greeks” (1 Cor. 1:23)

¹¹ <one> a

¹² From here to the end of the page, the text is in pencil.

¹³ <evid> science

Opinions may be divided into authoritative opinions and unauthoritative opinions.

Authoritative opinions may be divided into two groups: "laws" and "myths" ("tales" or stories").

The Greeks appear to have emancipated themselves at a relatively early date from the spell of the myths—"Greeks are always children"

The tellers of the myths no priests and prophets, but poets: Homer and Hesiod. As far as they were¹⁴ poets, they not merely transmitted piously and reverently the myths transmitted to them by their forefathers, but they arranged them into a coherent body and transformed them. The question is: did they transform them just into other myths or did they make something unmythical out of them? To answer this question, we must of course study the poets themselves.

A brief word about the lifetime of Homer and Hesiod and the problem connected with their persons and writings.

Men spoke of Homer and Hesiod as poets. But are they poets strictly speaking? The words "poet," "poem" do not occur in Homer and Hesiod: ἀοιδός—difference between ποιητής (maker, inventor) and ἀοιδός.

6. Pre-philosophic thought.

The word "philosophy" has various meanings—a vague and a precise meaning. In its vague sense, it means any opinions about God, world and man; if we take philosophy in that sense, then we must say, that there was never a period without a philosophy. But we assume, that philosophy had a beginning, that philosophy emerged by overcoming an obstacle—for "philosophy" means the attempt to replace opinions by evident knowledge.

We must then admit that there is pre-philosophic thought. This is generally recognized: mythical thought. In order to understand the origins of Greek philosophy, study of the primitives is much less important, than to find out what the Greeks themselves thought of "myths."

μῦθος = speech, tale; μῦθος ≠ λόγος = untrue tale ≠ true tale (Pindar)

But what gives the μῦθοι their support? Are they mere talk, mere tradition?

Ar. Eth. Nic. 1177b end—1178a beg. Philosophy as ὕβρις, ἀσέβεια

Xen. Mem. I 1, 16 f. Metaph. 982b 28 ff.

cf. the story of the tree of knowledge (of good, bad) in the Genesis.

¹⁴ <trans> were

The Greeks, too, had their holy traditions, and these traditions would have made impossible the rise of philosophy—but for one fact: the¹⁵ books in which the Greeks found their traditions, were not holy scriptures, but—the works of Homer and Hesiod.

We call Homer and Hesiod poets, and so they were called by the Greeks (Herodotus)—but we must be careful. ποιητής = maker, inventor—implies that the stories are not account of truth—presupposes reflection—the¹⁶ word does not occur in Homer, Hesiod—the word which they use is ἀοιδός (singer, minstrel).

What did the Greeks learn from their most famous singers? Hymns to the gods and praises of heroes and warriors—but also of Nestor and Odysseus.

I. Hesiod.

Two chief works:

Θεογονία —genesis of the gods. —gods

"Ἐργα καὶ Ἡμέραι—what man has to do and how
he has to do it and why—
the lot of man
— man.

We note: the 3rd great theme of philosophy is missing, “world.” κόσμος and πᾶν coined¹⁷ by Pythagoras (Timaeus 28b–c and Xenophon Memorabilia I 1, could show that the words were still somewhat strange).

For Hesiod, heaven, earth and ocean are gods. But what about animals?

See Liddell Scott s.v. ζῷον—

[4] the great discovery that man is an animal!

¹⁸On the Wisdom of the Ancients—a rather old-fashioned topic—when we read Hesiod's Theogony e.g., we are inclined to find in it mythologies or folklore, but not precisely wisdom. Else, we find poetry and philosophy and history, some of which is just “wisdom.”

Bacon spoke of the wisdom of the ancients, and he found it in the fables—allegories—he understood by wisdom hidden wisdom, consciously and deliberately

¹⁵ <the Greeks found these traditions> the Greeks

¹⁶ <we> the

¹⁷ <created> coined

¹⁸ [Here begins the portion of text that is written on the left page. A mark indicates that it is to be put before the plan which has been written at the top of this left page. Between the plan and the portion of text, the following notes, which were to be put before the plan, have been crossed out:]

Plato, Theatet. 155 Thaumas—Eris— $\bar{\nu}$ π \circ γ \circ α

Is this kind of interpretation an adequate interpretation?

hidden wisdom. Our difficulties in finding the wisdom of the ancients, may be connected with the fact that we have discarded allegoric interpretation. (Rejection of allegoric interpretation by Luther).

For Bacon was not the first, but rather one of the last of men indulging in such a kind of interpretation.

Plato, Theaetetus 155: Thaumas—Eris Xen. Symposium 5,6
ψύνοντα (a hidden thought)

152e, 180 Ocean—Thetys

Plato, Republic 578d.

Aristotle, Metaph. 983b27 ff.: Styx

cf. Protagoras. 316d.

Aristotle Metaph. 1000a9

Is this kind of interpretation an adequate one?

Note that Plato is least emphatic in the Protagoras and most emphatic in the Theaetetus!

ὑπόνοια in Plato—Rep. 378d only (Ast²⁰). Frogs 1008–1056.
in Aristotle—Eth. Nic. 1128a24 only (Bonitz²¹).²²

Plan: ²³	I Introduction 1–10	
	II: Recommendation of industry ²⁴ and justice:	
	man must work, and why he must work 11–382	
	III: Ἐργα 383–764	
	a) agriculture 383–617 (235)	
	b) sailing 618–694 (77)	382
	c) marriage 695–705 (11)	
	d) various rules 706–764 ¹⁾ (59)	
	IV: Ἡμέραι 765–828	64 ²⁵

¹⁾ θεοί—706—Fathers: Zeus—cf. Opp. s v τοκεῖς 182 ff.
φίλοι—707-715 Goddess

¹⁹ Reference written in pencil.

²⁰ Friedrich Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Hermann Barsdorff, 1908).

²¹ Hermann Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin: Reimer, 1870)

²² This and the preceding line are written in pencil.

²³ Two strokes have drawn in pencil on the left side along the items of the plan.

²⁴ <work> industry

²⁵ End of the text that is written on the left page.

ξένοι—715—cf. 225: ξένοι (strangers)—and *Theog.*: φιλότης and ἀπάτη children of Night.
 φίλοι—716.
 γλώσσα—717–721 (γλώσσα—“language” in Homer).
 ξένοι—722–723
 θεοί—724–764.

Interpretation of Hesiod's "Eργα."

A. The obvious meaning:

how and when the various works, especially of agriculture, are to be done (383–764)
 which days are good for which things²⁶ (holy and illfated days) (765–828).

The account of “works” and of “days” is preceded by what we may call a long introduction which contains²⁷ exhortations to work and an answer to the question why man ought to work (–382).

That answer is: “the gods keep hidden from man the means of life” (42). Since the gods do not supply man with what he needs, two ways are open to him: either to work or to use violence, injustice.

Accordingly, work or industry is identical, or coeval, or coextensive, with justice, and idleness is identical, or coextensive, with injustice.²⁸

The just are rewarded by the gods with all sorts of blessings, and the unjust are punished by the gods (225–285).

(Work and) ιδρώς	→	ἀρετή (285 ff.).
Work	→	wealth (381 ff.).
Justice and piety	→	wealth (320–341).

As in other teachings of that kind, it remains unclear, whether virtue or wealth is the last aim (cf. Adeimantos in Plato's *Republic*).

The 2 kinds of work discussed in detail are farming and sailing or trading:

farming	383–617
sailing	618–694.

²⁶ <works> things

²⁷ <shows> contains

²⁸ [The following sentences have been crossed out:]

The 2 kinds of work discussed in detail, are farming and sailing or trading: farming 383–617
 sailing 618–694.

The greater stress is laid on farming—

Hesiod definitely prefers farming to sailing and trading: 236 f.; 618 (“If”); 646.

By far the greatest stress is laid on farming—Hesiod definitely prefers farming to sailing and trading: 236 f.; 618 ("If"); 646.

A farmer's morality—Hesiod who was a shepherd himself, sides with the farmers against the “bribes-devouring” kings (37–39; 263 f.). If justice = work, then the working class is morally superior to the ruling class which had been celebrated by Homer.

The ruling class was a class of knights, of warriors—Hesiod is a mouthpiece of the farmers who are not warlike, but men of peace. Hesiod the singer of peace ≠ Homer the singer of war (Agon p.m. p. 586²⁹). He opposes peaceful emulation to [5] cruel strife (11 ff.).

The ultimate basis of Hesiod's preaching is belief in the gods, and especially in the power of Zeus. Accordingly,³⁰ the whole work is devoted to the praise of Zeus (1 ff., 105, 180, 235, 267). Why did the gods ordain that man should not be happy but by hard work? After all, the easy living³¹ gods might have granted to man an easy life (cf. 5–7 and 42–46 and 109–120).³²

Hesiod answers this question in two different ways.

- a) by the story of 5 subsequent races of men: the golden age, the age of silver, the age of bronze, the age of the heroes, and the age of iron. There seems to be a gradual increase of evil—but why? Why did³³ the golden age not last for ever? Cf. 109–120: no explanation—
- b) by the story of Prometheus (42 ff.)—the gods hide from men the means of life in the way of a punishment: work is a curse.

We notice then two contradictory views of work: work as a blessing (286–291) and work as a curse (42–44; 90–92; 109 ff.).

Work as a blessing—the lot of the just is good (225–237).

Work as a curse—the lot of the human race is bad (90–105).

This is all very similar to all what we know from the Bible: the story of Paradise etc. etc.

(Importance of such similarities for the understanding of fusion of Plato and Bible).

²⁹ Strauss's own edition appears to be *Hesiod: The Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, ed. and trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London: Heinemann, 1914).

³⁰ <He raises the que> Accordingly

³¹ [Entered in the margin:] easy living

³² [Written and circled in the margin:] easy living

³³ <was> did

In order to arrive at a deeper understanding, we must raise this question:

B. Which are the sources of Hesiod's teaching? (cf. in the Bible: God has spoken).

At the beginning of his poem, he invokes the Muses, the daughters of Zeus, to tell of Zeus

It is not the word of Zeus, but the word of the Muses, which Hesiod pronounces.

Invocation of the Muses in Homer: the goddess (Il. I,1), the Muse, daughter of Zeus (Od. I 1).

It is the Muse, not the poet who gives the account of Odysseus.

The muse grants the minstrel sweet song—she stirs him up to sing κλέα ἀνδρῶν (Od. VIII 62–64, 73).

Why does the poet invoke the Muses? This question is answered by Homer at the beginning of the ships-catalogue in the Ilias. Before he starts to enumerate the leaders of the Greeks who had come to Troy, he invokes the Muses who inhabit the Olympian dwelling in the following terms: “for you are goddesses, you are present at everything, and you know everything; but as regards us, we hear nothing but rumour, and we do not know a thing.” (Ilias B 484 ff.) I.e. the Muses give reliability, certainty to what without their support, would be mere rumour, mere talk. If a man desires to speak about things of which there is no human knowledge available, he needs superhuman information. Note the distinction between “what we know” and “what we do not know,” to critical mind.

Hesiod, too, invokes the Muses—i.e. Hesiod too speaks of things which are beyond the reach of human knowledge. Which are these things?

Some examples:

a) Hesiod speaks of 5 ages of the world—he himself lives in the age³⁴ of iron (174 ff.)—but he tells us how the age of gold etc. looked like.—what he says about the iron age, he knows from³⁵ his own experience, what he says about the earlier ages, he does not know by his own experience: he owes it to the Muses.

³⁴ <iron> age

³⁵ <by> from

b) Virgin Justice sits beside her father Zeus and tells him of man's unjust mind (257 ff.). Hesiod had not seen³⁶ Zeus sitting in heaven, in the way³⁷ in which Isaiah has seen the Lord sitting upon the throne.³⁸

c) "The eye of Zeus sees everything and understands everything" (267)—the *vóoç* of Zeus is different at different times, and it is hard for mortal men to understand (*voñται*) it (*Zeus' vóoç*) (479–490)—Hesiod wants to speak of the seasons proper for the works of farming—if they are variable according to the variable mind of Zeus, no man can talk of them.

d) But Hesiod is still more explicit: he wants to speak of sea-farming, yet he has only a small experience (*πεπειρημένος*)³⁹ of it—"nevertheless I will pronounce the will (*vóoç*⁴⁰) of Zeus; for the Muses have taught me to sing an unutterable hymn." (646–662).

The teaching of Hesiod is then based, to a certain extent, on the teaching of the Muses. But not his whole teaching: he emphasizes his indebtedness to the Muses and his lack of experience concerning sailing, but he does not say anything of that kind when speaking of farming. His teaching concerning farming is based on his own experience.

There is a third source of Hesiod teaching: "what people say" (803).

We have then 3 sources: Muses, Hesiod's own experience, "what people say."

Of these, the Muses seem to be the most important: the Muses are daughters of Zeus, and Zeus knows everything.

We must try to get more information about the Muses. That information is not to be found in the *Erga*, but in the *Theogony*. It does not matter whether the *Theogony* is a work of the same author—it provides us certainly with views infinitely nearer to those of Hesiod, than anything we⁴¹ might guess.

[7]

³⁶ [Written above in pencil, without indication of choice:] does not claim

³⁷ [Written above in pencil, with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted at that place:] in the way

³⁸ [The words "Lord sitting upon the throne" have been written in pencil above the following ones, which have been crossed out:] most holy.

³⁹ [Written above in pencil:] make proof of, have experience of

⁴⁰ [Written above in pencil:] mind

⁴¹ <else> we

C. First observations about the teaching of the *Theogony* concerning the Muses.⁴²

The Muses go abroad “by night, hidden by thick mist” Th. 9–10.

The interpretation of this passage is supplied by what is⁴³ almost the only⁴⁴ content of the first speech addressed by the Muses to Hesiod:

“We know to say many lies similar to truth

We also know to sing true things,⁴⁵ whenever we will.” Th. 27 f.

That is to say: the utterances of the Muses are not necessarily true—those utterances may consist of lies which look as if they were true; they may also be a mixture of truth and lies.

The latter possibility seems to be the most important: “the Muses go abroad, by Night, hidden by thick mist.” We may say: the teaching of the Muses is essentially ambiguous.

D. The ambiguity of Hesiod’s whole teaching.

- a) This result must be applied to the *Epya* as far as they are based on teaching of the⁴⁶ Muses.⁴⁷

In *Opp.* 225–266, Hesiod had asserted that Zeus rewards justice and punishes violence—but then he indicates (267–273) that he hopes that Zeus will not yet give greater satisfaction to the unjust. It is then clear that he himself has no fully certain knowledge of what Zeus intends to do in this respect. What he said before about Zeus’ intention, must be based on what the Muses taught him who know the mind of Zeus (cf. 660–662⁴⁸). Now, if what the Muses say, were simply true, he would be absolutely certain that Zeus would never grant greater satisfaction to the unjust⁴⁹ than to the just—consequently, *Opp.* 267–273 implies what *Theog.* 27–28 state explicitly.

We repeat then: the teaching of the Muses is essentially ambiguous.

⁴² [*Title written under the following one, which has been crossed out:*] C. The teaching of the *Theogony* concerning the Muses

⁴³ <the Muses themselves say when they first appeared to Hesiod> is

⁴⁴ <whole> only

⁴⁵ <utter truth> <sing true thing> sing true things

⁴⁶ <inspiration> teaching of the

⁴⁷ [*An arrow refers to the following note, written in pencil on the left page:*] Cf. Op. 11 ff—no denial of the teaching of the Muses in the *Theog.*

⁴⁸ [*A mark refers to the following note, which has been written in the margin:*] cf. 1–2.

⁴⁹ <just than> unjust

b) The same holds true of Hesiod's own teaching: "I would tell of some things" (10)—(I hope, what I say, is true or, I shall like to say the truth). Cf. 12: ἐπαινέσειεν ἀν νοήσας.⁵⁰

c) The last source of Hesiod's teaching is "what people say" (803).

But: only few know (814). Cf. 822–828, 479–492. Compare 760–764 and its context.⁵¹

Result: the whole teaching of Hesiod is ambiguous.

He seems to have been famous for his antiquity—cf. Agon p.m. 574–580,⁵² where Homer makes the ambiguous statements of Hesiod being unambiguous and—harmless. (See especially the two examples on p. 576).⁵³

[8]

Hesiod's whole teaching is ambiguous—this means: he himself was aware of the fact that it is not necessarily true, that it may be a mixture of truth and lie. Its truth is doubtful.⁵⁴

The reader must try to discover by his own exertion what is true and what is untrue in Hesiod's teaching.

E. Ambiguous character of Hesiod's teaching concerning work.

1. Obvious teaching concerning work.

The "Ἐργα emphatically recommend labor, and they emphatically blame idleness (286–326). Whereas the industrious is beloved by the gods, god and men are angry with the idle: the idle are compared to the drones who waste the labor of the bees, eating without working (303–311); therewith, the industrious are compared to the bees.

The work recommended by Hesiod is farming (and cattle-raising—775, 786 f.) rather than sailing and trading (236 f. 618. 646).

2. Conditional character of the praise of work.

That part of the "Ἐργα which is destined to teach why man ought to work is concluded by these verses: "If your heart within you desires wealth, do these things

⁵⁰ This reference is written in pencil.

⁵¹ The sentence which ends there is written in pencil.

⁵² [Written above in pencil, with a stroke indicating that it should be inserted at that place:] 580

⁵³ [Written in pencil on the left page:] (cf. Th. 229: ἀμφιλογίαι)

cf. Plato, Legg. 690e2–3: τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἔστι πλέον "the half is more than the whole"

Opp. 40—<"the half of the evil is more than the whole.>

⁵⁴ The sentence which ends there is written in pencil.

and work with work upon work" (383 f.) "If." I.e., a considerable part of the teaching of the *"Eργα* is merely conditionally true: it is true if your heart desires wealth, if the assumption is correct that it is⁵⁵ right thing to desire wealth.

Hesiod was not such a fool as to believe this; he says:

"Fools! They know not how much more the half is than the whole, nor what greater advantage there is in mallow and asphodel." (40 f.) (Asphodel was the potato of the ancients⁵⁶).⁵⁷

Another point: Hesiod gives the advice not to sail in spring—"yet in their want of understanding men do even this; for wealth (*χρήματα*) means life to vile mortals." (684–686)—i.e. wealth does not mean life to sensible people.

Moreover, desiring wealth would be unambiguously recommendable, only if wealth were unambiguously good, or if poverty were unambiguously bad. But this is not true. Read 316–320. (cf. 200: *αἰδώς*) θάρσος is ambiguous (while meaning "confidence," it may also mean "audacity")

324: *αἰδώς*—ἀναιδείη.

Cf. 717 f. (cf. the transition from 716 to 717: *ἐσθλός*—πένητες).

But not only is wealth an ambiguous thing, the ways of acquiring wealth are also ambiguous, so much so, that the necessary connection between work and wealth [9] cannot be seriously maintained.

Cf. 376–380. 479–492.

More fundamentally: both poverty and wealth are "god-given": 320. 638. 718. 40.

Recommendation of wealth and therewith of work is then not quite serious—on the other hand we cannot possibly assume that Hesiod recommends idleness.

Is there an alternative to the antithesis work-idleness, or bees-drones, and which is it? In other words, do we find in the *"Eργα* an indication to the effect that there are three, and not only two, βίοι?

3) Hesiod's recommendation of work and disapproval of idleness is connected with an account of his own affairs and with an attempt to settle these affairs.

⁵⁵ <the> it is

⁵⁶ Cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, s.v. Ασφόδελος, col. 1731, ll. 53 ff.

⁵⁷ A stroke is drawn in pencil in the margin along the beginning of this section of the text, until this point.

The speech is addressed by Hesiod to his brother Perses (10). Perses did not work; he had inherited together with Hesiod from their father an estate which the brothers divided among themselves, and he used his share for instigating a law-suit against Hesiod or, rather, for bribing the "Kings," i.e. the judges in order to cheat Hesiod out of his share⁵⁸ (27–39); he thus was reduced to poverty (32–35; 213 f.; 299 ff.) and compelled to beg of his brother⁵⁹ means of subsistence (395 f.). The idle and unjust and beggarly Perses is then the ideal addressee of Hesiod's exhortation to industry and justice; he is the living example of the connection between idleness and injustice—he is the living example of a drone.

But Perses is the not the only person addressed by Hesiod—he also addresses the kings, who assist Perses in his unjust attempt to cheat Hesiod out of his inheritance (248, 263; cf. 202). Hesiod clearly indicates his view of the kings by calling them "gift-devouring" (38 f., 221, 264): the kings are as idle and consequently as unjust as is Perses.

The fact that Perses and the kings belong to the same type of men is indicated by Hesiod's calling both of them *νήπιοι* (fools) (40; 286; 397; 633).

Hesiod makes us acquainted with another type of man by giving us some information about his and Perses' father. He is in a position to uphold his father as a model for Perses: for the father did work: he fled from wretched poverty and he settled in a miserable village, and when he died, he left his sons not too poor an estate (631, 639; 37). Nor is this all: the father is a model also because he turned away from the inferior kind of work, which is sailing, to the most recommendable kind of work, which is farming and cattle-raising (634, 639). Just as the foolish Perses and the foolish kings represent the drones, the father represents the bees. [10]

But what about Hesiod himself? He makes it quite clear that he is not a sailor. The fact that he stresses his lack of experience when speaking of sailing (649 ff.), whereas he does not say anything of the kind when speaking of farming and cattle-raising makes it clear that he knows farming and cattle-raising from his own experience. He originally was, as we know from the *Theogony* (23–26), a shepherd. But: he became a singer (654–662). We do not know—and even if we knew, it would not matter—whether Hesiod continued to be a farmer or shepherd, after he had become a singer; but we do learn from Hesiod the only thing which matters: the singer as such is distinguished from the beggar as such and the king as such (26, 202–208)—i.e. the singer is not a drone—and that he is also distinguished from the farmer and the artisan (21–26)—i.e., the singer is not a bee.

⁵⁸ [Written in the margin, with a mark indicating that it should be inserted at that place:] in order to cheat Hes. out of his share

⁵⁹ Brother <Perses>

We conclude that a) Perses and kings, b) the father, c) Hesiod represent 3 types of men, 3 different⁶⁰ βιοί. And “song” is that alternative sought for, to the antithesis ἔργον-ἀεργίη. That this is correct is shown likewise by the following fact.”Ἐργα are distinguished not only from ἀεργίη, but also from ἔπη (710), or from βουλαί (fr. 220⁶¹—p.m. p. 278). (Cf. 28–30 and 397–403.)

4) Hesiod explicitly distinguishes 3 types of men:

- a) “Best of all” is he who understands all things by himself,
- b) “good” (*έσθλός*) is that man too who listens to another who⁶² “speaks well,” and lays it to his heart
- c) “useless” is he who loves neither think for himself nor obey a man who speaks well. (293–297. Cf. 774–776.)

Perses, the foolish Perses, clearly represents the “useless” type—for the fool does not learn by listening to good advice, but only by suffering (218). Perses is constantly admonished to “remember” or to “lay to his heart” what Hesiod says to him—i.e. by listening to Hesiod’s advice, he would become an *έσθλός* (whereas at present he is νήπιος and therewith ἀχρήιος), as his father was—the father is a representation of the “good” type. But the singer Hesiod⁶³ who speaks *έσθλὰ νοεῖν* (286), who speaks εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως (107) represents the type which is “best of all.”

Now, the man of the best type is distinguished from the men of the lower types not by the fact that he works more, but by the fact that he understands better, that he [11] is more intelligent, more wise.

We conclude: “song” is not merely an alternative to the 2 parts of the antithesis work-idleness—it is even superior to both of them: the singer is superior to the bee as well as to the drone.

“Song” is only a modest expression for what is truly wisdom.

Now, “song” is not “work”—therefore it may be disguised, or ironically represented, as idleness; at any rate, if work ceases to be the highest type of life, idleness cannot be as bad as it appeared at first sight.

4^a) The idle are compared to the drones, for the drones eat without working. But—the drones are “stingless” (304); and Hesiod compares the idle to the stingless drones (whereas Plato when taking over Hesiod’s comparison explicitly speaks of

⁶⁰ [Entered above the line with a mark of insertion:] different

⁶¹ “The deeds of the young, the counsels of the middle-aged, and the prayers of the aged.” The page refers to Evelyn-White’s Loeb edition, however the numbering is from Rzach’s Teubner edition.

⁶² <to> who

⁶³ [Entered above the line with a mark of insertion:] Hes.

human “drones with stings”—*Rep.* 552c). Moreover, Hesiod concludes an enumeration of various human activities by mentioning together, and in the last place of his enumeration, “beggar and singer” (26). Both beggar and singer are distinguished from the worker, the farmer and artisan as well as the sailor and trader: both beggar and singer do not work, but they talk—the difference between the beggar and the singer being that the beggar “grieves” people by his talk, whereas the singer’s takes away griefs and sorrows; thus, to the beggar “the pasture of words” is unprofitable, whereas it is not to the singer (401–403; cf. *Th.* 97–103).

4^b) Just as idleness is not absolutely bad, work is not absolutely good. Work is a necessity, a punishment, a curse; work is not inseparable from justice: in the golden age, men did not work, and yet they were just (42–46; 90 f.; 109 ff.).

We have seen that Hesiod recommends most the work of the farmer and cattle raiser. Actually, however, he considered that kind of work to be something low: the Muses address him when they first appear to him, in these terms:

“Shepherds, dwelling in the field, base reproaches, mere bellies.” (*Th.* 26.)

The man who is nothing but a worker, is nothing but a belly—for he works in order to avoid hunger (404 229 f. 302 363 647), and he neglects his intelligence. Another way of putting this is to say that the Muses are the daughter of Memory, whereas Toil is the brother of Forgetting (*Th.* 226 f.). In the *Erga*, Hesiod expresses the same view “well and skillfully” by not mentioning⁶⁴ the Muses when he teaches the art of farming and cattle raising—he thus shows that that art is explicitly “without the Muses.”

[12]

He⁶⁵ does refer to the Muses however when speaking of the art of sailing. In order to understand the meaning of that reference, we must consider another antithesis to work and its implications. Vv. 579–581 run as follows:

“Dawn furthers (one) on the road, and it furthers likewise in work—dawn which when it appears sets many men on their way, and puts yokes on many oxen.”

Work, we have seen, is distinguished from idleness, and from ἔπη and βουλαί—we now see that it is also distinguished from “road” or “way” or—travel. And travelling appears to be⁶⁶ more human than working, i.e. working in the fields, since working can be done by oxen no less than by men (cf. 46 and 436–447). (Cf. 405 with Aristotle *Politics* 1252b10 ff. and 405 ff. with 441 ff., 459, 469 ff.) Or, to put the same thing somewhat differently, “way” is distinguished from “house” as well as from

⁶⁴ <invoking> mentioning

⁶⁵ [Written above:] [Another symbol: Muses are hidden (*Th.* 9; cf. *Op.* 730)—

The farmer has to do his work naked (*Op.* 391 f.)]

⁶⁶ [A mark refers to the following note which has been written on the left page:] Xenophanes fr. 7 Diels: νῦν αὐτ' ἄλλον ἔπειψι λόγον, δεῖξω δὲ κέλευθον.

Cf. λόγου πορεία etc. in Plato’s *Laws*.

“work” (cf. Th. 386 f., 750 ff.); for “work” (the work of the farmer) is inseparable from “house;” the first thing the farmer has to do is to get a house (405 ff.; cf. 364 f.) The farmer is bound to a fixed place. The sailor and traveler on the other hand changes his place. Consequently, the farmer does not see a great variety of things, whereas the traveler does. Cf. the beginning of the *Odyssey*.

The singer is a traveler, he travels from city to city, just as the Muses themselves go abroad. Nor is this the only connection between “way” and “song;” the singer teaches men the various “ways” open to them (286 ff.) (Cf. the explanation of Hesiod’s name.¹⁾ Note the fact that Hesiod speaks of his own life only when speaking of sailing!)

To sum up: the exhortation to work, and the praise of work (and especially of farming and cattle raising) is only the foreground of his teaching. That foreground hides what we may call his secret teaching which shows the limits of work and of a [13] life devoted to work by indicating the superiority of “song” or wisdom.

5) To whom is the obvious teaching addressed?

Not to the kings: for the kings are not exhorted to work, but to do justice. The obvious teaching is addressed to Perses.¹⁾ Now, Perses is called νήπιος or even μέγα νήπιος (286, 633). As long as we do not suspect a secret teaching, we naturally think that Perses is called νήπιος, merely because he does not listen to Hesiod’s exhortation to work. But once one has seen that that exhortation is not quite serious, one realizes that the qualification νήπιος has to be applied to the addressee of the obvious teaching, i.e. to the man who unreservedly accepts that exhortation. Hesiod’s obvious teaching is addressed to Perses as far as he is “childish”—for the exhortation to work is based on the condition that the person exhorted desires wealth, and it is “childish” to desire wealth (cf. 40 f., 381 f.).

But Perses is not merely νήπιος, he also is poor (394 ff.). Perses’ and Hesiod’s father who did work and who, therefore, ought to be a model to Perses, likewise was poor (634 ff.). The obvious teaching is then addressed to Perses as a typical example of the poor section of the “fools,” i.e. of the poor section of the majority of mankind. That this is the case, is shown by the following passages: 27–34; 213 f.; 498 ff.

In other words: the obvious teaching of the *Ἐργα* as far as it is an exhortation to work, and especially to farming and cattle raising, is addressed to the lower class, to the class who is ruled. Accordingly, Hesiod does not disclose that Perses has been

¹⁾ Etymologicum Gudianum s.v. Ἡσίοδος—Αἰολικῶς: ὁ τὴν αἰσιάν (auspicious) ὁδὸν πορευόμενος.

¹⁾ This holds true in particular of the section devoted to farming: Perses is addressed shortly after its beginning and again towards the end (397, 611)—It is sometimes asserted that Perses cannot be the addressee of the whole teaching concerning management of the farm, since the addressee is given advice as to his future life (695 ff.) and Perses was married already (397 ff.). But Hesiod does not say that Perses has wife and children, he only speaks of Perses’ family as a future possibility (*pote*).

reduced to extreme poverty but at the beginning of the rules concerning farming.⁶⁷ For, to repeat, it is not addressed to the kings who are not exhorted to work, but to do justice.

This holds true especially of the Ἡμέραι—part which starts with the advice to⁶⁸ tell the slaves of the changes⁶⁹ which come from Zeus (765 f.)

6) The secret teaching of the Ἔργα shows the deficiencies of the standard with which the life of the poor and of the slaves ought to comply. Therefore one might think for one moment that the standard accepted by Hesiod, is the life of the rulers, of the “kings.”

202 ff.—a contest between kings and singer—the superiority of the singer over the king.⁷⁰

[13 verso]

Hesiod was not a naïve and childlike man, he was not a mere singer. A singer would be a man inspired by the Muses, the daughter of Zeus. But Hesiod goes much beyond that: he knows what the Muses are. He tells us who the mother of the Muses is: that mother is Memory. This we can understand, whereas Zeus and the Muses are, to begin with, mere proper names. Of Zeus, Hesiod says that he sees everything and understands everything—Zeus, we may say, is wisdom. The Muses are then⁷¹ the “children,” the product of Wisdom and Memory. Now,

wisdom or understanding has its object: truth

memory has its object: anything told, whether true or untrue.

Accordingly, the Muses can say the truth, the pure truth, as well as lies similar to truth. By making this reflection on the Muses, i.e. on song, Hesiod ceases to be a singer—he becomes a wise man who uses song as a means of expression.

Hesiod addresses 2 kinds of men at the same time: the ordinary man and the potentially wise.

His teaching is twofold:	noble lie	truth
	exoteric	esoteric

The exoteric teaching of the Ἔργα says that work of the farmer = justice is the right life.

⁶⁷ A mark indicated that this sentence, which is written on the left page, should be inserted at this place.

⁶⁸ <that> to

⁶⁹ <Zeus> changes

⁷⁰ [Written below in pencil:] → Plato, Ep. II (p.m. p. 405). [Loeb edition]

⁷¹ <then> then

The esoteric teaching says that superior to the life of the farmer is the life of the king and of the singer who both do not work, and that the “singer” is superior even to the “king.”

If this is the meaning of the Erga, we cannot take the Theogony at its face value either. According to its obvious meaning, it is an account of how the gods were generated and how Zeus came to power. That the Theogony has a hidden meaning, was recognized by Plato e.g.

[14] A word about Theogony.

Doubt as to its obvious meaning, an account of how the gods were generated and how Zeus came to power.

Plato about the ὑπόνοια in Homer and Hesiod—the verse that Ocean and Thetys are the origin of all gods—anticipation of Thales’ view.⁷²

What is the character of philosophy in the nascent state?

- a) εἰπεῖν τὰ αἱεν ἐόντα—telling which are the oldest things, the first things, the things which are not born—the oldest⁷³ things which still are and will always will be.
- b) These oldest things are not the Olympian gods, but rather⁷⁴ earth, sea, heaven and love. Earth, Rivers, Seas, Stars and Heaven are no gods (Th. 104–105.) Chaos ἐγένετο!⁷⁵
- c) Genealogy of the Muses—answer to the question of what wisdom is.

If this is the case—how far can Thales be said to be original?

Thales of Milet (ca. 640–54).

Perhaps one ought not to say⁷⁶ that Thales is distinguished from Hesiod or Homer by the fact that he stated openly what he considered to be the truth. For he does not seem to⁷⁷ have written, i.e. published, anything. Some say, he was the first

⁷² [Written in pencil in the margin:] Cratylus 402b16.

⁷³ Written before “things”; a stroke indicates that the order of the words should be reversed.

⁷⁴ [Entered above in pencil, with a mark of insertion:] rather

⁷⁵ [Written below in pencil:] Ταῖα in Theog. and farming in Opp.! Sailing in Opp. and Ocean in Theog.

⁷⁶ [The beginning of this sentence has been written in the margin in pencil, to replace the following words which have been crossed out:] One cannot say

⁷⁷ <seems not to> does not seem to

who περὶ φύσεως διελέχθη (Diog. L. I 24). All that Aristotle says seems to go back to an oral tradition.

He is said to have been the first astronomer and the first who predicted eclipses of the moon; he is also said to have learned mathematics from the Egyptians.

The only theses which Aristotle, our most reliable authority on Thales' doctrine, attributes to Thales without adding a φασί, are:

- 1) Origin of all things is water
- 2) all things are full of gods.

Ad 1) ἀρχή was not used by Thales (see Anaximander n. 9). The first of all things is water. Most⁷⁸ reasons which Aristotle adduces as having led Thales to his thesis, are expressly Aristotle's own guess (humidity of σπέρμα). One reason however goes back to tradition (φασί): earth is floating upon water like a ship.

I.e.: what Thales is after, is what “supports” all things, what is “underlying” all things (ὑποκείμενον—substantia). Water is the thing which supports all things—out of which all things are born and into which they are dissolved again. [15]

Ad 2: the reason which Aristotle adduces: the magnet has ψυχή since it moves the iron. “All things are full of gods” means then “all things are living,” “all things have the power to move other things.”

The origin of all things is water
all things are full of gods

The origin of the gods is water.

All things are living—all things have a life of their own [—φύσις]—an interference by gods is required to move them.

Because all things are “supported” by water, and by water only, they have a life of their own.

The new thing in Thales' doctrine is: that he assumes one first thing only.

(In Homer: Okeanos and Thetys; in Hesiod: Chaos, Earth, Tartaros, Love).

⁷⁸ <The> Most

Anaximandros of Milet (floruit circa 546)—a pupil of Thales; a physicist, mathematician and geographer (was the first to draw a map of the earth).

Is said to be the first who dared to publish a speech π. φύσεως (n. 7 Diels⁷⁹). He wrote ποιητικῶς (n. 9). And he introduced the term ἀρχή: the governing beginning.

ἀρχή is the ἄπειρον, the boundless, limitless. Out of the ἄπειρον, heaven and earth etc. come into being, and they perish by going back into it—this happens time after time: many subsequent “worlds.”

All things—in particular the animals—genesis of the species, in particular of man.

That Out of which the things come into being, into the selfsame thing they perish—for they “pay each other satisfaction and τίσιν for the injustice κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. (n. 9) → The ἀρχή is of higher dignity than the things: the things do injustice to each other—they are opposing each other (wet-dry, hot-cold etc.)—the ἀρχή is beyond all contraries—it is one.

What comes into being, is bound to perish [the gods who were born, will die].

Constant movement—constant generation and destruction of “worlds.”

[The ἄπειρον cannot be seen, as one can see water]

This, however, is an objection to it, since incorporeal things have not yet been discovered.⁸⁰

[16 recto] Anaximenes of Milet (ca. 560–525)—pupil of Anaximander.

Work in prose.

ἀρχή is air (Aristotle)—it is boundless, but not undetermined as regards quality.

By its rarefaction and condensation, fire, water etc. come into being.

Gods as well as other things come into being out of air.

Air is god.

fr. 2: “our soul is air and keeps us together, in the same way the whole κόσμος is kept together by air.”⁸¹

General survey.

⁷⁹ Hermann Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1903), fr. A 7.

⁸⁰ Sentence written in pencil.

⁸¹ [A stroke refers to the following note, written in pencil on the left page:] But: Reinhardt, Parmenides, 175.

1) What is philosophy at its earliest stage? Quest for the ἀρχή—for the first thing, that thing which was at the beginning, which still is and which always will be, and which, while being, supports all other things. Wisdom is knowledge of the always being support of all things.

(In more general terms: wisdom is knowledge of the eternal, and philosophy is quest for the eternal. But the eternal might be something which has nothing to do with the things we see around us.)

2) What is the ἀρχή? There is not at the beginning⁸² a clear cut distinction between ἀρχή and things: the ἀρχή is the first thing. The⁸³ introduction of the term ἀρχή implies that the ἀρχή is not just a thing (*ἄπειρον*—no thing is *ἄπειρον*).

The ἀρχή is prior to the things—it is prior to heaven, earth, animals and gods. Whatever the ἀρχή may be (water, air, fire)—none of the thinkers discussed assumes that heaven and earth are the ἀρχή; they do not reckon with the possibility that heaven and earth are eternal things. This must surprise us. For, do not the stars always follow the same way? Is not the earth the most stable thing man knows? Thus we might be led to think that the view that heaven, earth are not the eternal things, presupposes a high degree of reflection. But just the opposite is true: the view that there are things older than heaven and earth, is not a discovery of philosophers, but a product of mythical thought. Whereas the view that heaven and earth are eternal, is the product of high reflection (cf. Plato, Laws, X: regularity of the stars is a discovery).

It is more natural to man to believe that heaven and earth are not eternal. Why? The heaven might fall down—the earth is shaken—the story of the flood in the Bible: God has to promise, to guarantee that he will never bring a flood again. Atlas carries heaven on his shoulders

⁸⁴Philosophy originally is quest for the first things—but myths, too, speak of the *[16 verso]* first things—philosophy comes into being, if the first things are no longer gods, but “ordinary things” (earth is no god in Hesiod!) → natural things. History of philosophy is, in a sense, nothing other than a progressive clarification of that first moment of philosophy:

The Milesians are engaged in quest for the first thing, for the thing which is not born, which still is, and which always will be. And the first thing which they

⁸² <yet> at the beginning

⁸³ <Yet> The

⁸⁴ The section of the text which begins here is written on the left page. This first paragraph is in a pencil.

discover, is the first thing because it supports all other things: all other things are generated by it, whereas the first thing is not generated.

The first thing which they try to discover, is accessible to observation and reasoning—they do not answer the question of the first thing by giving a proper name—their assertion is based on evidence which can be checked [→ science].

And they conceive of the first thing as of something which has its own growth makes all things grow—the first thing is not an external agent endowed with will which makes them grow and live according to his pleasure—[→ necessity].

Questions:

- 1) science and necessity.
- 2) Milesians assume that ultimate support is one—why is it one?
- 3) not the gods are the support (cf. Xenophon Memorabilia I 1, 10 f.)—easy to prove: the myths admit that Zeus is the son of Kronos—but what if one discards the myths and sticks to the view that the gods are $\delta\theta\alpha\nu\tau\omega\iota$.
- 4) difference between $\alpha\rho\xi\eta$ and $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ —is the $\alpha\rho\xi\eta$ a thing?

Milesians may have answered these questions—but we do not know anything about their answers.⁸⁵

[17] The first philosophers do not doubt that doubt. It is a matter of course for them that heaven and earth are not the first thing. They are distinguished from the story-tellers by the fact that they try to indicate such a first thing which is accessible to observation and reasoning, and that they conceive of the coming into being of the things out of the $\alpha\rho\xi\eta$ as of something equally accessible to observation and reasoning: no longer marriage of gods, but just such an ordinary thing as growing of plants.

But this is precisely the question: the ordinary things or processus—ordinary things = natural things.

3. Nature— $\varphi\mu\sigma\iota\varsigma$ —the word occurs once only in Homer—we can be absolutely certain that it was known to, and used by, the Milesians. In Homer the word means “constitution of a thing” as resulting from growth.” Things have their nature, their innate characters—a horse, a dog, a man, a plant, iron etc. They cannot simply change into another—they are what they are. You cannot do what you like with things: you cannot drive a peg into the wall with butter—things have their innate character, there is no arbitrariness about that [no miracles, no metamorphoses].

Being a thing, being, means to have a growth of its own, a grown constitution of its own. Now, all things need, in order to grow—a support (plants needs water and

⁸⁵ End of the section that is written on the left page.

sunshine). The ultimate support which enables things to grow, is the ἀρχή. The ἀρχή is not exterior to the things (like a Creator), but it is within the things, making them grow. And the ἀρχή itself is “growing,” κινουμένη.

The very concept of nature excludes then belief in the gods—the gods themselves would be subjected to the consideration of how they “grow” into being and of how their working is the outcome of their “growth”—they could be as “natural” as anything else. Cf. again Xenophon, Memorabilia, I 1, 10 f.

Philosophy originally is quest for the first thing which always is and which supports all other things by making them “grow” by its own “growth.”

Pythagoras of Samos (fl. ca. 532⁸⁶)⁸⁷ left Samos when Polycrates became tyrant—Pythagoras and Eleates in Sicily, Southern Italy—Asia Minor was being conquered by the Persians, the rule of tyrants on the Greek mainland and islands.—possibly a pupil of Anaximander—is said to have travelled in Egypt—was influenced by the Egyptians as regards both mathematics and way of life—took over from the Egyptians ritual of sacrifices etc.—imitated the Egyptian priests in his appearance: he is famous for the σεμνότης τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τοῦ σχῆματος⁸⁸—miracle works—his pupils in Isocrates’ times (Busiris 29⁸⁹) were admired more because of their silence than others because of their good⁹⁰ speeches—Pythagoras did not write. [18]

He was the originator of a peculiar βίος (Plato Rep. 600a). Aristocratic politics in the cities of Southern Italy and Sicily.

Two kinds of pupils: μαθηματικοί and ἀκουσματικοί, only the former were recognized as real pupils (Hippasos n. 2 Diels) Certainly a secret teaching.

⁹¹Note that Thales, too, did not write, and that Anaximander exposed himself in a “poetical” way. Alkmaion B5 (s. Diels’ note⁹²).

The secret teaching accounts for the fact that the tradition depicts Pythagoras as both a man of science and a man of miracles: he was a man of science as regards his pupils, and a man of miracles as regards the vulgar.

⁸⁶ <540> 532

⁸⁷ The portion of the sentence from this point to the period is written in pencil on the left page, with an insertion mark at this point in the text.

⁸⁸ Cf. Pythagoras, fr. A 5 DK (= Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* VIII 56).

⁸⁹ Cf. Pythagoras, fr. A 4 DK.

⁹⁰ <spee> good

⁹¹ This and the next four paragraphs are written in pencil on the left page, with an insertion mark at this point in the text.

⁹² „Vor einem Feinde sich zu schützen ist leichter als vor einem Freunde.“

As a possible example of the secret teaching, I mention this: it is certain that Pythagoras taught the rebirth of the soul, and the distinction between body and soul plays a very great role in Pythagorean philosophy:

soul—purified by music

body—purified by medicine

But the Pythagoreans conceived of the soul as a harmony of the body—soul comes into being as the “blend” of the opposites by right mixture (Plato, Phaedo). Then, soul is clearly mortal—but it is generated again, once the same proportion is reestablished again.⁹³

To Pythagoras, we owe two important words: φιλόσοφος and κόσμος.

⁹⁴“Philosophy” implies reflection on wisdom: insight that man cannot be wise—relation of wisdom and man or life: creation of a new βίος (perhaps he was the first teacher)—aristocratic politics.

“Kosmos”—connected with his view that things are numbers.⁹⁵

Pythagoras’ view of the first things:

ἀριθμός is οὐσία ἀπάντων

(Aristotle)

ἀριθμοί are αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα

How can we understand this?

Let us start from a consideration of the problems raised but not solved by the Milesians.

- 1) a) arbitrariness of “water” or “air” or “fire.”
b) insufficiency of ἄπειρον.
- 2) arbitrariness of processus of things from ἀρχή, and in particular of the ἐναντιότητες⁹⁶—from the first one thing. Question: is there a class of things where we do find one first thing, the firstness of which cannot be doubted, and from which is an absolutely unarbitrary order⁹⁷ other things, and things of opposite qualities, proceed?

⁹³ End of the section written in pencil on the left page.

⁹⁴ [The section of the text which begins here is written on the left page. The following sentence is written at the beginning of this section:] To Pythagoras, I said, we owe two words: philosophy and κόσμος.

⁹⁵ End of the section which is written on the left page.

⁹⁶ opposites

⁹⁷ <wrong> order

Such things are the numbers: 1 is the ἀρχή of the numbers (which as such is not a number) which generates all other numbers ($1+1 = 2$, $1+2 = 3 \dots$); the order of the numbers is necessary, and the numbers have opposite characters:

even	and	odd
ἀπειρον	and	πεπερασμένον ⁹⁸
unjust		just

τὰ ὄντα μιμοῦνται τούς ἀριθμούς,

the numbers are the models of the things.

But⁹⁹ Pythagoras says more: he says that things¹⁰⁰ are numbers. This assertion is inseparable from the new term coined by Pythagoras, the term κόσμος.

3) Let us return again to the Milesians.

The origin of the things is water → originally there were no things
—things are solid

----- air → ----- —things are not airy

----- ἀπειρον → ----- —things are limited. [19]

I.e.: all statements about the origin presuppose as a matter of course, a knowledge of the originated things as such. They presuppose knowledge of the fact that things as such (and not merely as this or that thing, dog, horse, etc.) have a character, a nature. It is this reflection which is at the bottom of Pythagorean philosophy which thus paves the way for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. It is this reflection which is implied in the very discovery of κόσμος. For κόσμος is the order of things (not their sum); κόσμος is the character of originated things as such.

Let me express this somewhat differently. The Milesians were naively interested in the question: out of what do the things come into being (and into what do they dissolve?) And the Milesians showed that the beginning and the end and the process itself was “natural” (κατὰ χρόνου τάξιν¹⁰¹).

“Heavens and earths” are generated, say, by water and dissolve into water—but what about “heaven and earth” itself?¹⁰² They may not be eternal—yet they possess

⁹⁸ infinite and finite

⁹⁹ <Pyth. could have left it at that, if he had been able to distinguish between corporeal things and incorporeal things. But to him, the numbers were things. But such a distinction was not made before Plato.> But Pythagoras

¹⁰⁰ <the> things

¹⁰¹ Cf. Anaximander, fr. B 1 DK.

¹⁰² [On the other side of the preceding page, the following schema has been drawn:]

a certain consistency—what gives heaven and earth its consistency? what is the support of things as things? Number and harmony. Number and harmony make things being things.

ὄντα	μιμοῦνται	ἀριθμούς
ὄντα	εἰσί	ἀριθμοί

εἶναι = μιμοῦσθαι — identity = analogy.

(Plato replaces μιμοῦσθαι by μετέχειν—and the ὕλη).¹⁰³

Xenophanes of Colophon (near Ephesos, Asia Minor) lived in Sicily (ca. 565–470).

Said to have been a pupil of Anaximander.

Wrote exclusively poems. Relation to Parmenides (according to Reinhardt¹⁰⁴).

ὄν = ἔν = θεός

ἀρχὴ πάντων ὕδωρ—


a) If ὕδωρ is ὄν, which is the difference between the being of ἀρχή and the being of ὄντα?

b) If ὕδωρ is not an ὄν, then μὴ ὄν would be support, or origin, of ὄν
→ ὄν cannot have been guaranteed by μὴ ὄν → ὄν is αἴτιον.

ὄν = θεός who being κράτιστος must be one → one being.

for: θεὸς εἶναι = κρατεῖν

[ἀρχὴν εἶναι = κρατεῖν] [→ Ontological proof of the demonstration of god].



¹⁰³ Sentence written in pencil.

¹⁰⁴ See Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1916), 89ff.

[The gods of the philosophers and the gods of belief].

[20]

The things which we see clearly are many—consequently, they are not:

αἴσθησις deceives us, only λόγος leads to truth.

Xenophanes gives a problematic account of sensual things—doubtful about everything; asserted one thing only: εἰναι πάντα ἔν (A 35, cf. B 34).

Xenophanes is more important, he certainly is more tangible in other respects: as a mouthpiece of a new spirit.

In fr. 1, he states that he is opposed to reciting the fights of Titans and giants, “the fictions of former generations” (πράγματα προτέρων)

fr. 18: “Not that from the beginning the gods have shown the mortals everything, but they [sc. men] gradually discover the better by seeking.”

fr. 2: he asserts the superiority of “our wisdom” to “strength of men and horses”—for the victor in an athletic contest would not be able to give the city εὐνομίη and he would not make the city wealthy. [σοφία as the basis of εὐνομίη—justification of philosophy on the basis of political life, answer to the question: why philosophy? → Plato’s philosopher-king].

fr. 11: “Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything which with men is a disgrace and a reproach, theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.”

fr. 15: “If oxen, horses, or lions had hands or could draw with their hands and make works (of art) as men can, the horses would draw shapes of gods similar to horses...”

Parmenides¹⁰⁵ floruit ca. 503 (somewhat later if we can trust Plato’s Parmenides), of Elea in Southern Italy, pupil of Xenophanes and/or Pythagorean Ameinias. Is said to have given the laws to his fellow citizens.

διὰ ποιημάτων φιλοσοφεῖ¹⁰⁶—διὰ ποίησιν¹⁰⁷ ἀσαφῆς ὄν (A 17).
αἰνιγματωδῶς (A 19)

Implication of “Thales”: nothing can come into being out of nothing.

τὸ ὄν cannot have come into being out of μὴ ὄν.

But τὸ ὄν must have come into being out of another ὄν, the first ὄν, the ἀρχή.

¹⁰⁵ [Written in pencil on the left page:] Kurt Riezler, Parmenides, Frankfurt am Main 1934: “Indes war der zweite Teil (sc. des Gedichts) auf keinen Fall am Umfang und Gewicht nur Anhang des ersten. Der erste war Einleitung, als Einleitung Anweisung für den zweiten.” (p. 42.)

¹⁰⁶ Fr. A 1.

¹⁰⁷ <ποιημάτων> ποίησιν

[21] Yet, is ἀρχὴ ὄντων an ὄν? Pythagoras implicitly denied it by reducing the things to numbers; for the ἀρχὴ ἀριθμοῦ is not an ἀριθμός.

But this is a very paradoxical consequence. Should the support of all things not be?

It is more being, it is of higher dignity that the generated things. And if the support of all things is not a being, it is not: then all things would have come into being out of nothing.

In short, the relation of being and nothing is not clear—or, in other words, becoming is not clear—for “becoming” precisely means that something which was not, is about to be.

Parmenides:

1) Being is, and Nothing is not—this is the sure foundation—necessity (ἀνάγκη)

Consequently, being is αγένητον—for if it had come into being, its origin would be either ὄν or μὴ ὄν.

a) ὄν cannot have come into being out of ὄν—for there is nothing outside of ὄν

b) ὄν - - - - - μὴ ὄν—for μὴ ὄν is not.

No past and future as regards ὄν—for past and future means “μὴ ὄν.”

being = being now = being always now. Consequently ἀκίνητον—for else it would be moved by μὴ ὄν. ὄν as ὄν is indivisible, and perfect: or else there would be some “no.”

2) But what about the many things which are in motion? This is merely δόξα βροῶτν ≠ ἀληθεία which is accessible only to νοῦς and λόγος.

3) there seems to be at least the duality of ἀληθεία and νοῦς—it is denied by Parmenides: νοεῖν = εῖναι (fr. 5).

The basis of that statement:

- a) speech and thought are speech and thought about something, about ὄν: “nothing” cannot be spoken of or thought of. Thinking is thinking of being. (Inseparability of λέγειν and νοεῖν: fr. 6, 1).
- b) Thinking judges of being: what is necessary for thought, is—one does not need something beyond thought to establish being.
- c) thought is nothing but thought of being—and thought and its “aim” (ἔνεκα) are the same thing (fr. 8, 34 ff.).

4) Explanation of the δόξα on the basis of its initial dualism, i.e. on the basis of the absurd assumption that both ὄν and μὴ ὄν is. Explanation is given, not in terms of νοεῖν—for this is impossible—but in terms of sense-perception, of sight. [22]

ὄν = νοητόν—visible = light.

μὴ ὄν = unthinkable—unvisible = darkness.

The clearest separation of ὄν and μὴ ὄν leads to the discovery of "element" as well as of "mixture".

Two wreaths of "light" and two wreaths of "darkness"

[two = many

wreath = a remembrance of the σφαῖρα of the ὄν].

¹⁰⁸(parallelism of the θεά who says the truth and the she-δαιμῶν who governs the world of δόξα [θεά—fr. 1, 22

δαιμῶν—fr. 1, 3; 12, 3; 13 (Plutarch)].

A. Relation of ἀληθεία and δόξα.

ἀληθεία—λόγος νοῦς—ὄν

δόξα—δόξα βροτῶν—ὅμιμα ἀκοή γλῶσσα (fr. 1, 35)—
ἔθος πολύπειρον (fr. 1, 34; cf. fr. 1, 3)

δόξα is made by man (πλάττονται—fr. 6, 4–5).

Reinhardt

It is ὄνομα καταθέμενον by man (ὄν, μὴ ὄν) (fr. 8, 38–39; 9, 1; 19). Mortals have fixed¹⁰⁹ their opinions to name two μορφαί (ὄν, μὴ ὄν) (fr. 8, 53). ἔθεντο: fr. 8, 55. γνώμην τίθεσθαι or κατατίθεσθαι = work (i.e. to sanction a νόμος)
νεγόμισται fr. 6, 8.

ἀληθεία—νόμος or θέσις

(φύσις—νόμος)

¹⁰⁸ [A mark refers to the following note, which is written in pencil on the left page:] cf. ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and ἥπιος in Rep.

[Written below:] Riezler p. 42 says that δαιμῶν in fr. 12 is the same as the θεά of fr. 1: "Die Götter der Wahrheit . . . lehrt den Schein als Schein aufzulösen und in seiner Mitte selbst die Wahrheit zu schauen, die da alles lenkt." Es handelt sich nicht um zwei Welten, sondern um zwei Erkenntnisweise; dieselbe Welt falsch oder richtig (als Einheit) sehen.—fr. 2: das Anwesenden im Abwesenden sehen und umgekehrt (p. 46). ["The goddess of truth . . . teaches to dissolve the appearance as appearance, and in its very place to contemplate the truth, which leads there everything." It is not about two worlds, but about two modes of knowledge; to see this same world falsely or rightly (as unity).—fr. 2: to see the present in the absent and conversely (p. 46).]

¹⁰⁹ [Written in margin :] κατέθεντο

what is by itself—what is by arbitrary convention).

B. Parmenides presents his teaching in a poem. He presents himself as being driven on a horse-drawn chariot and guided by the Sunmaidens on the way which leads “the knowing man through all cities” until they come to the door on which the ways of Night and Day part. This door is guarded by Δίκη. The Sunmaidens persuade Δίκη to open the door. Parmenides, the κοῦρος, is allowed to enter on his chariots and he meets the goddess who reveals him the truth. The whole teaching of [23] Parmenides is nothing other than a revelation by the goddess.

a) the first thing which we have to observe is that apart from Parmenides, the κοῦρος (fr. 1, 24), all other persons are female: the goddess, the Sunmaidens, the δάιμων, Δίκη,¹¹⁰ and even the horses. (Of course, ἥπτοι were usually female in poetry, and so were the Muses.)

Now, we find that Parmenides teaches that women are “warmer” than men (fr. 52–53)—i.e. women are on the side of φῶς, men on the side of σκότος.

(Cf. the opposite view of the Pythagoreans: Aristotle Metaphysics 986a 15 ff.)

b) Δίκη guards the door leading to θεά: Δίκη ≠ θεά (fr. 1, 14, 22).

Δίκη keeps under her guard: γενέσθαι and ὅλλυσθαι so that they cannot escape (fr. 8, 14 f.) whereas Ἀνάγκη keeps τὸ ὄν, in fetters (fr. 8, 30) (or Μοῖρα: 8, 37 [cf. 1, 20].

(cf. fr. 10, 6—but in δόξα-part).

Δίκη ≠ ἀληθεία [νόμος ≠ φύσις].

Herakleitos of Ephesos, fl. ca. 480.—of noble family, resigned the dignity of a βασιλεύς to his brother.

Herakleitos is the most difficult of the Pre-Socratics. If we consult Aristotle about him, we get the impression that Herakleitos’ teaching is just another kind of Milesian philosophy: Herakleitos says, first is the ἀρχή. But if we consult the fragments of Herakleitos, we get an entirely different impression. Not that Herakleitos does not mention the fire—he most emphatically does—but we immediately see that there must be something infinitely deeper behind that statement. We get the impression that the Muse of Herakleitos is not reasoning, but the human heart, the human soul, that he gazes, not upon the outside, but upon himself. He is not ironic, but indignant. He appeals more to modern feeling than does any other pre-socratic philosopher, and indeed even any other ancient philosopher. But precisely here lies the

¹¹⁰ [A mark refers to the following words, which are written in the margin:] Ἀνάγκη Μοῖρα ἀλήθεια

danger—For example—ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν (fr. 101) “I have sought myself.” But it is not certain that it means that Herakleitos was primarily and merely interested in self-knowledge. It is equally possible to translate the fragment by “I have inquired of myself” in the way in which people inquiries of the oracles—then Herakleitos intends to say that he is an oracle, that he replaces the oracles.

For what is the character of the oracle-giving god? He speaks in riddles—he “neither speaks nor hides, but signifies (alludes)” (fr. 93). Now, this is precisely how Herakleitos expresses his views: he alludes, but he does not speak, or explain. He was called ὁ σκοτεινός. It is extremely difficult to understand what he means. The wisest principle as regards interpretation of Herakleitos was indicated by Socrates: “What I understand, is good; so I presume that what I do not understand is good too; but one [24] needs a Delian diver to get at his depth.”¹¹¹

Herakleitos has something more to say about “hiding.” φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ (fr. 123). But the oracle does not hide (fr. 93). I.e. the philosopher does not present truth in such a cryptic way as truth itself does, but almost as cryptically. His style imitates the character of truth.

fr. 92: “The Sybil utters with mad voice things which are not laughing (grave) and unadorned and not steeped in unguents, and she does this διὰ τὸν θεόν.” The unenigmatic statement of the truth would appear as madness.

(fr. 95, 109: It is preferable to hide ἀμαθίη).

φύσις is hidden. What is the hidden φύσις? ἀρμονίη ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείττων (fr. 54). φύσις is ἀρμονία—of the opposites. Harmony consists in variety, plurality, πόλεμος. The One is not distinguished from the plurality (as water is distinguished from the originated things), but that One is the Many, the Being is the Becoming: what is, is the becoming.

φύσις a flow—but a river: you cannot step twice into the same river, and yet it is the same river (fr. 12, 49a, 88, 90). Soul has πείρατα (fr. 45).

όδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ώντή (fr. 60)—fire becomes water, water becomes fire—identity of the way, of the movement.

The One is called by Herakleitos “everlasting fire” (fr. 30) and “soul” and ἐν σοφὸν μοῦνον (fr. 32) and λόγος (fr. 1, 2). “Nature” only solves the problem of reconciling the contradictions: nature alone is wise.

The relation of the One to the things is compared to the kingship of a child (fr. 52, 124) and of war (fr. 53)—the most beautiful κόσμος is not distinguished from a heap of rubbish; boys deceived Homer the wisest of the Greeks (fr. 56); truth is paradoxical, the wisdom of the whole is contradictory to our wisdom.

¹¹¹ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* II 22.

Truth—error

λόγος κοινός—private (fr. 1 f., 50).

ἔργον—νομιζόμενα (fr. 14, 48, 67).

ὄνοματα

awakeness—sleep (fr. 89).

Which is the way to discover the truth? Not πολυμαθίη (fr. 40) But: self-knowledge (fr. 116). In other words: not by travelling, or by going will you find the boundaries of the soul (fr. 45), but by considering where you are going (117), what [25] you are “doing.” men γίνονται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε without knowing it, although they do it all the time, they do not know what they are doing (fr. 1) (Cf. fr. 75, 71, 72, 73, 60). The truth is that everyone could know (boys deceiving Homer); understanding is different from sense-perception; although presupposing the latter (fr. 107).

The political implications—

“The people (δῆμος) must fight in defence of their law, as for the wall (of the city)” (fr. 44). The δῆμος, the common people, but “the many are bad, and few are the good” (fr. 104—δῆμος). But what is the law? “This too is law to obey the will of one (man)” (fr. 33).

In which case? If that one is excellent (fr. 49, 121).

“Those who speak with sense must strengthen themselves with that which is common to all, just as a city strengthens itself by the law, nay even more; for all human laws are nourished by the one divine law.” (fr. 114.)

But can that divine law be called a law strictly speaking?

“To the god, all things are beautiful, and good and just,¹¹² but men have assumed that some things are unjust, and others are just.” (fr. 102). [Note the order: 1) ἄδικα, 2) δίκαια]. δίκη is ἔρις (fr. 80).

One ought not to act as “children of parents” (fr. 74), i.e. as we have received it.

ὄνομα ≠ ἔργον fr. 48 (fr. 67).

regards νομιζόμενα¹¹³ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους (fr. 14).

The first thing is One—but how can the Many proceed from One?

¹¹² <just and> good and just

¹¹³ <ὄνομαζόμεν> νομιζόμενα

Pythagoras did not solve the problem: for ἀριθμοί ≠ πράγματα

(difference between numbers and continuous magnitudes: Zeus).

Parmenides did not solve the problem: for he denied the Many

Heraklit - - - - - for he denied the Many also.

The 3 last Pre-Socratics whose teachings I shall mention, can best be understood on the basis of Parmenides.

Parmenides made clear:

1) What is, is—it cannot come into being and it cannot perish—it cannot undergo internal transformations.

2) If we make the impossible assumption that there is Being and Nothing (or that there is Plurality), the things could be understood as a mixture of these elements.

Empedokles of Acragas in Sicily—fl. ca. 444. Poems only (περὶ φύσεως and καθαρμοί Purifications).

Empedokles blames the μανίη of his predecessors who claimed to have found the whole, whereas as a matter of fact they asserted that to be the whole which they happened to come across. Empedokles admonishes his pupil to consider ἔκαστον [26] in¹¹⁴ the way in which it is δῆλον (fr. 2, 4—Archytas fr. 1 Demokrit fr. 8).

4 “roots” or ἀγένητα¹¹⁵ and Φιλία, Νεῖκος.

The One (the Parmenidean σφαίρη) = the 4 roots ruled by Φιλία only—the present stage is ruled by Φιλία and Νεῖκος [continuation of Parmenides' Aphrodite governing the world of δόξα and Heraklit's πόλεμος].

Two kinds of births and passing away of the things: one, if there is too much φιλία, the other, if there is too much Νεῖκος.

Anaxagoras of Klazomenae (west of Smyrna). Older contemporary of Perikles.

Wrote in prose; was persecuted for ἀσέβεια. His works were burned in Athens. He retired to Lampsakos (Hellespont) where he founded a school.

σπέρματα (seeds) and νοῦς.

¹¹⁴ <as far as> in

¹¹⁵ See fr. B 7 DK.

Originally, there was a mass (*πάντα ὁμοῦ*)¹¹⁶ which is divisible, infinitely divisible¹¹⁷—but any particle, however small, contains the qualities of all others: everything has portions of everything in it—the things are distinguished from each other by the fact that some have more of one quality, others more of another.

The source of motion is *voūs*—the finest of the things—called “God” (divinity of anything else is denied)—the *voūs* rules everything and knows everything and brings the *kόσμος* into being—the *voūs* is *ἀμιγής*¹¹⁸ (or else it would not be able to act upon everything equally), yet it enters some things and¹¹⁹ others not: distinction between inanimate and animate things.

Demokritus of Abdera (in Thracia)—ca. 460–370.

Atoms and Void.

Infinite numbers of atoms which move about in the void in all directions—infinitely variety of sizes and shapes, but without “secondary qualities.”

μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ή τὸ μηδέν.¹²⁰

“Trueborn” and “bastard” knowledge.

[27] Sophists—teachers of (political) virtue—technique of eloquence—use of didactics and antithetics as developed by Parmenides, Herakleitos¹²¹—no philosophers, but they use philosophy and in so doing, some sophists elaborate certain points in a more or less original way.

The new thing in sophistry: application of philosophy, i.e. of φύσει-νόμῳ antithesis to things political.

(I do not think that the sophists take the political things very seriously—see my remarks on Isocrates’ Nicocles and Evagoras—yet the trouble was that they did not take seriously the only serious thing: truth).¹²²

¹¹⁶ See fr. B 1, 4, and 6 DK.

¹¹⁷ divisible <into part>

¹¹⁸ See fr. A 58 DK.

¹¹⁹ <not> and

¹²⁰ Fr. B 156 DK.

¹²¹ [A mark here refers to the following note, which is written in pencil on the left page:] and ὁμοιότης = identity, underlying Pythagoreanism!

¹²² This parenthetic sentence is written in pencil.